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ABSTRACT: 
Social interactions and the resulting peer effects loom large in both economic and social contexts. This 
is particularly true for the spillover of (un)ethical behavior in explaining how behavior and norms 
spread across individual people, neighborhoods, or even cultures. Although we understand and ob-
serve the outcomes of such contagion effects, little is known about the drivers and the underlying 
mechanisms, especially with respect to the role of social identity with one’s peers and the (un)ethical-
ity of behavior one is exposed to. We use a variant of a give-or-take dictator game to shed light on 
these aspects in a con-trolled laboratory setting. Our experiment contributes to the existing literature 
in two ways: first, using a novel approach of inducing social identification with one’s peers in the lab, 
our design allows us to analyze the spillover-effects of (un)ethical behavior under varied levels of social 
identification. Second, we study whether contagion of ethical behavior differs from contagion of un-
ethical behavior. Our results suggest that a) unethical behavior is more contagious, and b) social iden-
tification with one’s peers and not the (un)ethicality of observed behavior is the main driver of behav-
ioral contagion. Our findings are particularly important from a policy perspective both in order to foster 
pro-social and mitigate deviant behavior. 
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Individuals do not co-exist in pure isolation but interact within social contexts, or as the emi-
nent Elliot Aronson (2011) emphasizes it in his book’s title: individuals are social animals. De-
spite the long tradition in anthropology and sociology, economists have been rather negligent 
of the relevance of norms, values, and social influence of peers on one’s behavior for a long 
time. Fortunately, over the last two decades there has been a push in the economic discipline 
to expand our understanding of what comprises a more sophisticated individual decision 
maker by accounting for the individual’s identity, morals, and other-regarding concerns (cf. 
Rabin (1993), Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Akerlof & Kranton (2000), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), 
Charness & Rabin (2002),  Bénabou & Tirole (2011)). These approaches have enriched our un-
derstanding by regarding social and economic decisions as a function of the respective social 
and economic environment and the relevance of one’s peers’ behavior. 
Recently, both economists and psychologists have started engaging in a promising dialogue 
on behavioral ethics and the drivers of (un)ethical behavior by bringing together classical and 
behavioral approaches (for a recent review see Irlenbusch & Villeval (2015)). A standard eco-
nomic argument is the assumption of fixed preferences, translating into one’s conforming be-
havior being the result of social conventions or norms. Conversely, psychologists, sociologists, 
and recently some economists, among others, have challenged this fundamental assumption, 
suggesting that behavioral adaptation is the result of converging preferences and fluid tastes. 
Bernheim & Exley (2015) refer to the former as belief mechanisms, and to the latter as prefer-
ence mechanisms. Along these lines, scholars in economics and psychology have attempted 
to shed light on the mechanism of peer effects using both lab and field experiments (for an 
overview see Houser et al. (2012) and Lahno & Serra-Garcia (2015)). Exemplarily, peers are 
found to significantly affect individual judgment (Asch, 1951) and risk taking behavior such as 
credit decisions (Banerjee, et al., 2013), stock market participation (Shiller, 1984), investment 
decisions (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990), and littering behavior (Cialdini, et al., 1990). Peer effects 
are also at play in education (Sacerdote, 2001) and productivity at work (Falk & Ichino (2006), 
Mas & Moretti (2009)), and in the form of neighborhood effects (Case & Katz (1991), Katz, 
Kling & Liebman (2001), Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005), Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007),  Chetty, 
Hendren & Katz (2015)).  
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Studying behavioral spillovers and the adaptation of observed peer behavior particularly in 
the domain of (un)ethical behavior (we will call it behavioral contagion or behavioral adapta-
tion) looms large due to its economic and social significance. Much like emotional contagion, 
the underlying idea of behavioral contagion depicts a form of social influence leading to the 
emulation of behavior one gets exposed to (see Wheeler (1966) for a discussion and differen-
tiation from other frequently used terms such as conformity and imitation). It comes natural 
to analyze situations in which individuals can simultaneously engage in either ethical or un-
ethical behavior. However, most existing studies have rather focused on analyzing ethical and 
unethical behavior in isolation. Economic studies have highlighted peer-effects in pro-social 
behavior (Frey & Meier (2004), Gächter et al. (2013)), voluntary cooperation (Thöni & Gächter, 
2015), as well as within the unethical domain, such as the use of performance enhancing drugs 
(Gould & Kaplan, 2011), and dishonesty (Innes & Mitra, 2013). In sum, there exists ample evi-
dence that peer effects are a phenomenon across different contexts, social environments, and 
cultural groups and individuals adjust own behavior to resemble one’s peers.  
However, scholars across various fields are still disunited on whether the methods used qual-
ify to observe clean peer effects, or whether for a large part our observations are an artifact 
of potential confounds. Exemplarily, a stream of literature points at methodological problems 
in soundly measuring such effects, especially outside the controlled laboratory environment 
(for a critical discussion see Manski (1993) & (2000) and Angrist (2014)). Our work adds to this 
literature by broadening our understanding of how peer effects and the resulting behavioral 
contagion play out within the spheres of both ethical and unethical behavior simultaneously. 
Using a novel design that allows us to study different types of behavior and behavioral spillo-
vers simultaneously is one of the ways we add to the existing literature. Beyond that, we use 
a novel approach to induce varying levels of social identity in the lab to study behavioral con-
tagion in different social settings. We will return to this shortly. 
Our goal is to contribute to this debate by shedding light on two aspects: first, does social 
identification to one’s peers facilitate the spread of (un)ethical behavior? Second, is the mag-
nitude of behavioral contagion dependent on the (un)ethicality of the behavior and if so, 
which behavior is more contagious? By answering these questions, we contribute to the grow-
ing economic literature on the role of identity and social context on behavior in general (cf. 
Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Akerlof & Cranton (2000), Charness 
& Gneezy (2008)) and spillovers resulting from peer effects in particular (i.e. see the previously 
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mentioned seminal Moving-to-Opportunity literature). However, in our study we analyze 
lower-bound peer effects because adaptive behavior remains unobservable by one’s peers 
and thus carries no signaling value. Because such a setting sets us apart from what is typically 
meant by the term conformity, we use the more encompassing term behavioral adaptation 
(for a discussion of the mechanism and empirical literature on conformity see Bernheim 
(1994) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch (1998)). 
Embedded in a controlled lab experiment, our approach to measuring peer effects is a varia-
tion and extension of a dictator game as introduced by List (2007) and used by Bardsley (2008). 
We capitalize on a one-shot dictator game in which participants are given the opportunity to 
give to or take money away from the charity before and after learning peer behavior. That is, 
the extend the one-shot setting by introducing a revision option to account for behavioral 
contagion (see Thöni & Gächter (2015) for a related approach). We deal with the noted reflec-
tion problem (Manski, 1993) by introducing a novel design, which we will discuss in more de-
tail in the design section of our paper (see chapter 6). In short, our approach centers on two 
key design elements: first, only those who actively observe another participant’s behavior can 
react and revise initial behavior. Second, behavior of those who are observed is held fixed and 
cannot be changed afterwards, which is public knowledge. Such an approach allows us not 
only to study general peer effects in an unbiased way, but also to shed light on the relevance 
of factors such as the social identity to one’s peers and the (un)ethicality of observed behavior 
in driving behavioral changes. Such an experimental set-up allows us to contribute to existing 
research on peer effects in multiple ways and thus open a venue for future research. 
In particular, we construct a list of personal statements taken from a major American dating 
website to categorize participants according to overlaps in preferences and interests (for a 
discussion, see Hitsch, Hortaçsu & Ariely (2010)). 2 This approach allows us to create a measure 
of social proximity and use this as an exogenously varying matching device to study peer ef-
fects in the lab and to combine the best of both worlds: for one, the controlled laboratory 
setting mitigates the previously discussed arising difficulties when studying peer effects in the 
field. For another, our novel measure of social proximity allows us to mimic social affection 
that is normally absent in the laboratory setting due to its intended nature of anonymity. Our 
                                               
2 We use these questions to generate a composite matching score with other participants and randomly vary the information 
set across treatments given to matched pairs of participants. The exact matching mechanism and the treatment variations 
will be explained in more detail in chapter 6. 
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results indicate the validity of this proximity measure as the observed peer effect (i.e. the 
magnitude of the behavioral reaction) is aligned with the degree of measured social proximity.  
Our study extends the existing literature on peer effects in a number of ways. We do not only 
provide a clean approach to test whether peer effects exist in the context of both ethical and 
unethical behavior; we also deliver sound evidence on how such peer effects depend on the 
social identification with their peers. We achieve this by contributing from both the content 
and the methodological perspective. 
From a content perspective, our work focuses on making a substantial contribution to better 
understand drivers of behavioral adaptation in the domain of both ethical and unethical be-
havior. In social dilemmas and cooperative settings, existing theoretical and experimental lit-
erature points out that giving and taking are indeed different concepts that trigger different 
behavior (cf. Cox et al. (2008), Gächter et al. (2015)). Essentially, we put these findings to a 
test in a setting of individual decision-making under peer influence in which no strategic inter-
action between individuals exists. That is, we try to answer whether the unethicality of ob-
served behavior or social identification to one’s peers is a stronger predictor of behavioral 
contagion. While different streams of research suggest the relevance of both channels (see 
discussion in the next chapters), we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to evaluate 
both channels in terms of their impact on behavioral contagion. From a methodological per-
spective, our contribution in this paper is to introduce an approach that does not only allow 
us to directly mimic social proximity in the lab, but also to vary its degree. If successful, such 
an approach opens the venue for a broad range of more refined future research examining 
the role of social proximity in cooperation, reciprocity, and punishment behavior. 
So far, the economic literature in particular has been fairly silent on answering three naturally 
arising questions with respect to peer effects that we will attempt to answer in this paper.  
Question 1: Is there a systematic difference of behavioral contagion with respect to unethical 
behavior (e.g. taking away) as compared to ethical behavior (e.g. donating)?  
It is reasonable to assume that behavioral contagion is a function of the observed behavior’s 
nature. One obvious reason is the costs involved: good behavior implies bearing costs in order 
to improve the well-being of others, while bad behavior often implies improving one’s own 
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well-being in one way or the other at the expense of a third party.  A number of seminal em-
pirical contributions examining neighborhood effects indicate that the adaptation of behavior 
is asymmetric and depends on whether one has been exposed to good or bad influences and 
to what extent (cf. Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005)). While existing studies have typically resorted 
to explaining behavioral contagion in one direction, that is either ethical or unethical, our ex-
perimental design allows us to compare the contagion of both behavioral domains directly. To 
our knowledge, this is the first controlled approach to directly and simultaneously compare 
peer effects and behavioral spillovers across these two domains. 
Question 2: To what extent is behavioral contagion in either direction (i.e. of moral and im-
moral behavior) mediated by the social proximity to the peers?  
Following the existing literature on social identity, it is reasonable to assume that observing 
behavior of people who are socially closer or similar depicts a more salient signal in terms of 
what is socially accepted or an existing norm. However, the exact interaction between social 
proximity and the contagion of (un)ethical behavior remains unclear. In addition, good and 
bad behavior differs in terms of the information set available to the individual. While good 
behavior might entail some ambiguity with respect to what is ‘appropriate’ within a given 
context, bad behavior might be less ambiguous: the nature of bad or unethical behavior im-
plies the overstepping of (social) boundaries or infringing laws. Consequently, the wiggle-
room for self-justification is narrower in the latter case.  
Question 3: What is the stronger driver of behavioral contagion – social proximity or the 
(un)ethicality of observed behavior?  
Two quite distinct streams of literature exist that examine the role of either social proximity 
or exposed behavior within the framework of peer effects: one on the relevance of social iden-
tification, and one on behavioral observation. In this research, we attempt to unify both lines 
of research by using an experimental design that encompasses both aspects. We will return 
to this aspect in more detail in the next chapters. 
 In anticipating the results, we find that the magnitude of spillover-effects is a function of so-
cial identification that is asymmetrically biased towards the contagion of unethical behavior. 
Overall, our results suggest that within a given peer context it is more likely to observe behav-
ioral contagion in the form of unethical than ethical behavior. Across different specifications, 
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we find that social proximity to the peers is more relevant to the crowding-out than to the 
crowding-in of ethical behavior, while the observation of (un)ethical behavior alone is insuffi-
cient to trigger any particular behavioral change. Thus, the mere observation of behavior 
alone is insufficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical sphere, but is rather 
contingent on the social identification to one’s peers.  The interaction between social identi-
fication and type of observed behavior adds to the understanding of peer effects and yields 
relevant policy recommendations. 
In summary, it can be stated that our experimental work is along the lines and an extension 
of the seminal Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) field studies that examine neighborhood effects 
and assimilation of behavior (see discussion in chapter 3.3). To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first experimental examination of behavioral spillovers as a function of varied 
levels of social identity and the (un)ethicality of observed behavior, which in combination with 
the methodological novelty depicts our principal contribution.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a more detailed thematic background 
and the course of our investigation, whereas we deal with the conceptual framework of be-
havioral contagion and its existing relevant literature in more detail in Section 3. In Section 4, 
we will discuss the drivers of behavioral adaptation and some of the more relevant concepts 
from the fields of economics and (social) psychology. We will introduce a simple theoretical 
model in Section 5 before turning to our experimental analysis in Section 6. We close with a 
concise discussion on potential policy recommendations in Section 7 and a conclusion and an 
outlook in Section 8. 
 
2. Background and Course of Investigation 
A basic principle of classical economic theory suggests that individuals form rational expecta-
tions based on available information and act on them accordingly. However, even the great 
John Maynard Keynes (1936) expressed his concern about the rationality of individuals to re-
alize efficient investment decisions in the long run already 80 years ago. Instead, Keynes ex-
pected individuals to follow the herd, thus stressing the importance of peers for many eco-
nomic decisions. Since then, a contrasting strain of literature emerged that accounts for the 
relevance of behavioral traits on the individual decision-making process. Understanding the 
underlying mechanism of peer effects is key to comprehending its impact on economic deci-
sions and outcomes. For the bigger part, existing research on peer effects mainly resorts to 
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field experiments or purely observational studies that are generally inferior to controlled lab 
experiments in terms of, among others, a clean identification of the relevant channels, en-
dogeneity, and reflection problems (see Manski (2000), Falk & Fischbacher (2002)). Only re-
cently, there has been a push to study peer effects in the lab, allowing us to gain a deeper and 
often a more reliable understanding of the underlying mechanism Angrist (2014). 
Social interactions in general and the potentially resulting peer effects in particular play an 
instrumental role from both the societal and economic perspective. Existing literature indi-
cates that standard economic forces alone cannot encompass many of the outcomes that we 
observe in real life. Examples are, among others, the escalation of crime rates or the massive 
surge in female labor participation rates in World War II (cf. Mulligan (1998), Levitt (1999). See 
also recent findings on paternity leave by Dahl, Løken & Mogstad (2014)). Instead, social in-
teractions are found to offer explanations helpful to understanding the causes of rapid shifts 
in economic fundamentals. Such ripple effects are likely the result of social interactions, thus 
raising the awareness about the importance of understanding the underlying mechanism of 
peer effects (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004). 
Although explicit research on peer effects and the resulting behavioral spillovers (in the liter-
ature sometimes referred to as behavioral or social contagion) has its origins in the late 19th 
century, the underlying concept has been observed long before.3  Reportedly, an abstruse-
seeming stream of suicides happened after reading Goethe’s The Sorrows of the Young 
Werther two hundred years ago. “My friends […] thought that they must transform poetry 
into reality, imitate a novel like this in real life and, in any case, shoot themselves; and what 
occurred at first among a few took place later among the general public […]” (Goethe, quoted 
in Rose (1929, p. 29)). The widespread imitation of this behavior gave rise to fear among the 
population and governments, ultimately leading to a ban of the book in Italy, Leipzig, and Co-
penhagen (Phillips, 1974). The outbreak of the Tanganyika laughter epidemic of 1962 in 
Uganda is another infamous example of behavioral contagion. There, a mass hysteria infected 
                                               
3 Research on behavioral contagion is fragmented and different disciplines have introduced own notions and definitions re-
ferring to the same or closely related concept. Existing research interchangeably uses different terms to describe such situa-
tions, among others: conformity, behavioral contagion, imitation, or behavioral adaptation. Due to its more generic nature 
and the context of our research, we will mainly resort to the term behavioral contagion or behavioral adaptation. For the 
sake of comprehensibility, we will abstain from clearly defining and delimiting those concepts for now. We will return to this 
point in chapter 2. 
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almost 100 pupils with contagious laughter, forcing several schools to close down for days 
(Rankin & Philip, 1963). 
Initially, the concept of social contagion has been introduced in the form of a social phenom-
enon – as opposed to a biological one – explaining why and how certain forms of behavior 
soak through society (for early work see Baldwin (1894), Tarde (1903)). Since the 1950s, em-
pirical research on this topic has been on the rise with evidence suggesting that the mere 
exposure to and contact with individuals or culture is sufficient to trigger behavioral conta-
gion. Conditional on a sufficiently salient trigger, behavioral contagion leads to behavioral ad-
aptation towards observed behavior. In this paper, we aim at expanding the existing 
knowledge on the drivers of saliency, in particular with a focus on both the ethicality of the 
observed behavior and the degree of social distance or proximity with the observed individual. 
A long tradition in social science highlights the importance of social identity in understanding 
individual behavior within the framework of social interactions (cf. Bogardus (1928)). A salient 
state of social identity is found to trigger favoritism towards those of stronger social kinship.  
The term social identity is eclectic and several of its facets have been studied in existing eco-
nomic research. While the term encompasses a broad range of conceptual elements, from 
shared preferences and experiences to shared cultural and religious beliefs, in this paper we 
follow the primal understanding of this term as introduced by Tajfel and Turner (1979). More 
precise, we refer to the existence of social identity if a person derives self-esteem from be-
longing to the peer group and has a preference for exhibiting similar behavioral patterns (for 
a similar approach, see Chen & Li (2009)). Using this definition in combination with a simple 
but richer implementation of social identity, as applied in our experiment via the observation 
of preference similarity, is conducive to both deriving lower bound results for the role of social 
identity in facilitating (un)ethical behavior and easier reproducibility of our results. This line of 
research is important from a policy perspective in generating effective measures to trigger 
both more pro-social and less anti-social behavior, consequently reducing the otherwise re-
sulting economic and social inefficiencies. 
With notable exceptions, existing research has been struggling to overcome a number of chal-
lenges to study clean peer effects in the lab, especially in contexts where social identity plays 
a mediating role. Among these, inducing or at least proxying the natural occurring variation of 
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social identity has proven to be difficult. Following the tradition of the minimal-group para-
digm (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), psychological research has introduced a number of ways to proxy 
social identity in the lab, such as having participants interact with participants that were as-
signed the same color avatar (Tajfel, 1982), a similar name (Pelham, et al., 2005), same birth-
day (Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989), or imagined closeness (Gunia, et al., 2009). So far, it has 
proven to be challenging to study peer effects under controlled settings in general, let alone 
within a more sophisticated social environment such as varied levels of social identity. Existing 
economic research has resorted to using a dual approach, studying peer effects in the lab and 
in the field, with both approaches having their limitations. Applying a novel methodological 
approach to induce varying levels of social identity in the lab allows us to combine the best 
features of both worlds to study peer effects beyond what had been possible so far. 
To our knowledge, the first economic contribution examining this question in a controlled set-
ting by varying social identity among individuals is the study by Bohnet & Frey (1999).4 They 
used a rough proxy for social distance by varying the degrees of identification and found evi-
dence that social distance is decisive in predicting the extent of other regarding behavior in a 
dictator game setting.5 Other examples of economic approaches that bridge anonymity and 
induce social identity, among others, vary the wording of the experimental instructions 
(Hoffman, et al., 1996), use face-to-face interaction (Bohnet & Frey, 1999) or show pictures to 
one party only (Eckel & Petrie, 2011), reveal names (Charness & Gneezy, 2008), reveal prefer-
ences such as those for paintings (Chen & Li, 2009), or recruit friends and family members 
(Brandts & Solà, 2010). Such studies typically yield the robust finding that stronger social iden-
tity triggers favoritism. Two natural problems arise with the concepts used in economics so 
far. Firstly, using face-to-face communication or allowing participants to interact with friends 
or family members introduces serious biases and crowds-out the revelation of true prefer-
ences (Roth, 1995). Secondly, and more relevant to the point of our experiment, the degree 
                                               
4 Although motivated by a previous study of Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996), the work of Bohnet & Frey (1999) is the first 
to directly vary (a proxy for) social distance among peers. Instead, Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) varied the language used 
in the distributed instructions, arguing that “subjects bring their ongoing repeated game experience and reputations from 
the world into the laboratory, and […] dictator instructions […] may imply that the objective is to share the money with 
someone, who, though anonymous, is socially relatively near to the decision maker” (Hoffman, et al., 1996, p. 655). 
5 Research usually refers to this concept as social identity, which encompasses both social distance and its inverse, social 
proximity. Throughout this paper, we will mainly refer to social proximity. Another approach to mimic social proximity used 
in economic and psychological experiments has been to ask participants to bring along their friends or relatives and study 
their interaction in a controlled environment. Among other things, we will discuss potential drawbacks of these and related 
approaches in chapter 5 in more detail.  
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of social identification measured in the lab by these concepts can hardly be varied and is rather 
binary. Our approach of using dating-website questions as a matching device allows us to in-
duce and exogenously vary different levels of social proximity in the lab in order to study their 
role in the spillover of (un)ethical behavior. 
It is this paper’s aim to shed light on three questions stated above and to contribute to a better 
understanding of the general mechanism of peer-effects. For this reason, we propose a novel 
approach to proxy different levels of social proximity among peers in a laboratory setting. Such 
an approach allows us to exogenously vary social characteristics and study their role in behav-
ioral contagion. We mimic social proximity by the use of questions taken from a major Amer-
ican dating website to capture individual preferences and interests and use the matching 
scores of overlapping answers among lab participants as an exogenous matching device across 
treatments. This allows us to study decision-making going beyond simple ingroup - outgroup 
comparisons. Rather, our approach provides us with an extensive array of possibilities to 
match participants according to their shared similarities. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to use such an approach. Thus, we not only complement existing field studies, but 
also broaden the scope and utilization of lab experiments in explaining behavior and behav-
ioral changes in peer settings, especially within the unethical domain.  
For this purpose, we extend the currently existing approaches by a social component that suf-
ficiently considers the relevance of social distance and proximity to one’s peers in affecting 
behavioral decisions. This attempt will be at the heart of this paper, leading to a proposed 
theoretical extension of Akerlof’s (1997) and Glaeser & Scheinkman’s (2004) seminal work on 
social interaction, social distance, and conformity, where the extent of social distance is a 
function of geographic location. We, however, emphasize the role of social distance as a func-
tion of an actual overlap in personality based on e.g. personality traits or interests. 
Another substantial contribution of our research is the direct comparison of behavioral con-
tagion of ethical and unethical behavior. In general, existing research has focused on shedding 
light separately on behavioral spillovers of either ethical behavior (cf. Thöni & Gächter (2015)) 
or unethical behavior (cf. Gino et al. (2009)). Considering the differing settings and games used 
in existing experiments to study behavioral contagion, current research does not help to un-
derstand whether and to which extent behavioral contagion in either direction differs from 
each other. Instead, experiments that add to the understanding of the potentially different 
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mechanisms should place participants in a uniform environment and allow for the spillover of 
ethical and unethical behavior.  
Our experimental set-up allows us to study these questions. Participants play a one-shot dic-
tator game in which they decide how much money to donate to or take away from a charity, 
which resembles a variation of a dictator game implemented by List (2007) and Bardsley 
(2008)). Here, the (un)ethicality of (taking away) donating money to the charity is stressed by 
explaining the consequences of their behavior clearly to the participants. That is, all the money 
that is (taken away) donated to the charity will (not) be given forward to the charity, thus 
individual behavior will (harm) benefit the charity. Hence, participants face a riskless but in 
terms of its (un)ethicality precisely defined situation in which they have to decide whether or 
not to personally benefit at the expense of a charity of their choice. After reaching their initial 
decision, participants are given the opportunity to learn about other participants’ initial deci-
sions followed by the option to revise their own initial decision.  
Several economic and psychological theories are able to explain behavioral contagion even 
under full anonymity and without observability of one’s own initial and potential revision de-
cision, as implemented in our experiment. Among these are concepts relating to social deci-
sions and social distance (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), imitation of prefer-
ences (Sliwka, 2007), social learning (Bandura, 1971), norms (Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bicchieri 
(2006)), self-expansion (Aron & Aron, 1986) or even guilt (Kandel & Lazear, 1992). Many of 
these concepts are not strictly distinct, in both their assumptions and predictions. Thus, in this 
paper we will not attempt to resolve which approach explains behavioral contagion best but 
rather focus on shedding light on the drivers of behavioral contagion and its interrelation with 
the social identity dimension and the extent of (un)ethicality of observed behavior. 
 
3. The Conceptual Framework of Behavioral Adaptation  
3.1 The Mechanism of Social Interaction and Challenges of Measuring its Ef-
fects 
A growing body of literature suggests that social interactions are principal not only to humans, 
e.g. in making social or economic decisions, but also to animals, e.g. in finding the right strat-
egy or place to maximize one’s hunting success (Laland, 2002). Evidently, social interactions 
trigger different reactions and outcomes, which are referred to as social effects. Different 
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streams of literature refer to such interactions in different ways: bandwagons, conformity, 
epidemics, herd behavior, imitation, neighborhood effects, peer influences, social learning, or 
social norms (see Hyman (1942), Merton (1957), Granovetter (1979), Jones (1984), Manski 
(2000)). In addition, Pingle & Day (1996) subsume these and other types of behavior, including 
following an authority, habit, thoughtless impulse, and hunch, as economizing behavior. Some 
call it simply peer effects.6 Although these notions refer to different mechanisms, their out-
come is often (but not always) similar; that is, the individual’s adaptation to observed behav-
ior. However, some mechanisms encompass stronger interaction with the peers than others 
do (e.g. the peer’s ability to observe my reaction and exact change in behavior) and involve 
more or less deliberation.7  
As we will discuss in chapter 3.3 in more detail, existing research indicates that the existence 
and persistence of social effects are context specific and may even lead to, among others, 
higher consumption of alcohol and drugs, cheating, and smoking. The same is also found to 
be true for pro-social and cooperative behavior. Thus, before turning to the specific effects of 
social interaction, we shall make the effort to understand the underlying mechanisms first. 
The concept of social interaction lies at the heart of social psychology and sociology, for ex-
ample in order to explain the formation of tastes (Weber, 1978). The importance of social 
interaction in explaining social phenomena has a long tradition and is often ascribed to Suth-
erland’s Differential Association Theory (Sutherland, 1939). Akerlof (1997) stresses the view 
that the theory of social interaction is key to understanding why individuals do not succumb 
to isolated and purely self-maximizing decision-making. Instead, this concept gives rise to con-
ceive an individual as someone who constantly interrelates with the underlying social envi-
ronment and produces and deals with the resulting externalities. A principle consequence of 
                                               
6 Often, the term “peer effects” is used to refer to all of these mechanisms without specifying the exact channel through 
which behavioral adaptation arises. Although it is important to shed light on the different channels through which social 
interaction potentially transitions into behavioral adaptation, the focus of this study lies in understanding the role of exoge-
nous factors such as social proximity that have the potential to influence the intensity of behavioral adaptation. We shall not 
attempt to settle the argument of which approach explains the mechanism of our experiment best. Instead, we will discuss 
some of the more prominent concepts and mechanisms in the fields of economics and social psychology that resemble the 
mechanism of behavioral adaptation the way it is implemented in our experiment in chapter 4. For our purpose, however, 
we will assume peer effects to be in play whenever an individual ࢏′ݏ behavior changes after having been exposed to behavior 
of individual ࢐, irrespective of the direction of the behavioral change. In turn, however, we assume behavioral contagion to 
be in place whenever individual ࢏′ݏ behavior changes in the direction of individual ࢐ behavior. 
7 It is worth noting that it is far beyond this paper’s scope to shed light on all of these concepts. Instead, we will pick out and 
discuss those concepts of which we believe are of bigger importance to what we analyze within our experiment. We will 
return to this point in chapter 4. 
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extending the rational model based on Becker’s early work by such a social dimension is that 
the type of the resulting individual is more sophisticated and resembles more closely to the 
intuition of sociologists than the classical economists.  
Manski (1993) distinguishes between two types of social interactions.8 One is endogenous in-
teraction in the form of, for example, information exchange among criminals or social norms. 
The behavior of the relevant peer group mediates the likelihood that the individual will engage 
in the same kind of behavior. In addition, exogenous interaction emphasizes that the propen-
sity of an individual to behave in a certain way is also mediated by exogenous characteristics 
of the group such as their attitude toward crime or social and economic status.9  
In social interactions, externalities abound. The key mechanism of social interaction implies 
that one’s personal net benefit is a function of the behavior exhibited by one’s relevant social 
group or contact person (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004).10 Inherent to such interactions are 
strategic complementarities in the form of circular cascades where “even if changes in funda-
mentals create only a small change in the level of activity for each individual, each individual’s 
small change will then raise the benefits for everyone else pursuing the activity” (Glaeser & 
Scheinkman, 2004, p. 84). In principle, small changes in fundamentals may cause large shifts 
in outcomes, which are sometimes referred to as the butterfly effect, a term hailing from the 
chaos theory (Lorenz, 1963).  
Social interactions are also highly relevant in understanding the spread of criminal behavior. 
Social interaction plays a decisive role in the formation of gangs and the recruitment of young 
criminals (see Reiss (1988) and Jankowski (1991)). This is particularly true for the criminals’ 
                                               
8 Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004) provide a more distinct categorization of the mechanisms that generate social interaction: 
physical, learning, stigma, and taste-related interactions. For the purpose of this experiment, we will extend this categoriza-
tion in order to better capture the mechanism of behavioral changes we are interested in. We will discuss these points in 
more detail in chapter 3. 
9 While these two aspects represent interactions that are shaped by the underlying social environment, Manski (1993) also 
introduces correlated effects that explain similar behavior as the result of facing similar institutional environments (see also 
Manski (2000)). This third aspect is not considered any further since correlated effects are not social effects and are thus 
neither created by social interactions nor create social multipliers (see Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman (1996), (2003)). 
Using a novel approach in our experiment, a clean variation of both endogenous and exogenous interaction allows us to draw 
causal inferences that are more precise than what has previously been possible. We will return to this important point in our 
design section of chapter 6. 
10 The term ‘relevant social group or contact person’ is vague in existing research. A social group or contact person is self-
reported and defined from one’s individual point of view and refers to one or more individuals whose behavior either has a 
direct or indirect impact on one’s well-being, e.g. through resource externalities or other-regarding preferences. While it is 
important to understand the different channels through which behavioral spillovers occur, the focus of our study is to shed 
light on the drivers instead. See chapter 4 for a discussion.  
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decision to engage in illicit behavior jointly (Reiss (1980)). “Social interactions seem to create 
a sense of invulnerability and a willingness to violate social norms and take risks, as long as 
one is in the company of like-minded individuals” (Glaeser, et al., 1996, p. 511). Social inter-
action also strongly affects stigmatization, which is important from an evolutionary perspec-
tive. As the number of criminals rise, illicit behavior becomes more common and thus poten-
tially more accepted; and as criminality converges towards ‘normality’, the (social) rents of 
illicit behavior increase due to increased attractiveness, social acceptability and a crowding-
out of legal activities where earnings from legal activities are stolen by criminals (see Rasmus-
sen (1996) and Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1993)). 
Researchers face substantial difficulties measuring social interactions and its resulting effects 
in a clean way. In a real-world instance, assigning changes in individual conformity to distinct 
mechanisms are subject to identification problems (Angrist, 2014). As argued before, this 
problem arises because individual behavior is affected by both endogenous (e.g. the group’s 
behavior) and exogenous effects (e.g. group characteristics) and, in addition, uniform behavior 
can be the result of similar unobserved characteristics (Manski, 1993). Previous empirical re-
search involved regressing a person’s actions on the action of his peers. However, Manski 
(1993) points at three fundamental problems concerning this methodology: first, drawing 
causal inference is difficult when endogeneity is a problem, in particular when the individual’s 
and its peer’s behavior is interactive and influences each other circularly. Second, omitted 
variables increase the likelihood of spurious correlations between actions. Third, in reality, 
sorting and self-selection into particular neighborhoods renders it difficult to understand what 
actually drives behavior. Arguably, empirical research in particular faces these challenges be-
cause one only observes the behavior of individuals who self-selected themselves into, for 
example, moving to a better neighborhood, but not of those who decided to turn down the 
opportunity (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 2004).11 
Of particular interest to our research are social interactions leading to the spread of unethical 
behavior. Existing research points to a strong presence of positive covariates across individu-
als’ decision to engage in criminal behavior. In particular, Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman 
                                               
11 Prominent examples and forceful ways of addressing these issues include, among others, the work of Case & Katz (1991), 
Katz, Kling & Liebman (2001), Angrist & Lang (2004), Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005), Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007), Ludwig & Kling 
(2007), Damm & Dustmann (2014), and Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015). We will discuss these and other empirical contribu-
tions examining peer effects and behavioral adaptation in the field in more detail in chapter 3.3. 
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(1996) state that only covariance across criminal decisions of individuals explains existing var-
iance in crime rates, which is far beyond any theoretical prediction of crime rates. 
In order to mitigate any term-related confusion on the side of the interested reader, we are 
in need of a term that allows us to capture a particular type of behavior that resembles a 
subset of social interaction and its resulting social effects. More specifically, we are not inter-
ested in the drivers of all kinds of behavioral changes resulting from observation, but only in 
behavioral changes that lead to a convergence of behavior. We are thus proposing the impar-
tial term behavioral adaptation to capture such behavior.12  
The term behavioral adaptation refers only to a subset of social interaction because social 
interaction may lead to all kinds of social effects where the resulting behavior may or may not 
converge towards what has been observed. In its basic form, the existence of social effects 
does not tell us much about the specific behavioral reaction, if any, that follows from this 
exposure. In principle, the result of social interaction could lead to either behavioral alienation 
or adaptation. For the purpose of this study, we will focus on the latter. In turn, behavioral 
adaptation refers to those situations only in which the resulting behavior is coherent to the 
behavior one has been exposed to. Our study sheds light on the key drivers triggering an indi-
vidual’s response to become more like others, in one way or another.13 
Existing macro- and micro-level data inadequately catches the underlying mechanisms and 
the causal relationships relevant to our project. That is, answering the questions of how be-
havioral adaptation varies with different levels of social proximity and whether this interplay 
is different for adaptation towards ethical versus unethical behavior. As has been argued by 
Angrist (2014), with rare exceptions like Kling et al.’s (2007) Moving-to-Opportunity research, 
                                               
12 Behavioral adaptation has also been studied in the field of evolutionary game theory as well as in the theory of learning in 
games (see Selten (1978), Roth & Erev (1995), Schlag (1998), and Apesteguia, Huck & Oechssler (2007), to only name a few). 
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to touch upon all streams of literature that have shed light on the general 
process of behavioral adaptation. Instead, we focus on the studies most relevant to our experiment and extend our apologies 
to colleagues whose research remains unnamed in this paper. 
13 Studying the drivers of behavioral alienation is a potential venue for future research, as this line of research has yet to catch 
attention from economists. Akerlof (1997) refers to this behavior as the result of status-seeking efforts. Beyond this, however, 
behavioral alienation can be the result of e.g. one’s desire to not be identified with a particular social group. 
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most field studies on peer-effects suffer in one way or the other from endogeneity, self-selec-
tion and confounds resulting from confusing the relevant subjects with the peers.14 This ren-
ders it difficult to disentangle causation from simple correlation. For these reasons, Manski 
(2000) and Angrist (2014) emphasize the importance of controlled laboratory experiments 
that are able to reduce potential confounds to a much stronger degree, which is what we 
attempt to do here. 
 
3.2 Why Understanding Behavioral Adaptation Matters 
Social interaction and more so the resulting social effects tell us a lot about the underlying 
mechanisms affecting social and economic outcomes. As argued by Akerlof (1997, p. 1006), 
“social interaction theory explains why social decisions – such as the demand for education, 
the practice of discrimination, the decision to marry, divorce, and bear children, and the deci-
sion whether or not to commit crimes – are not simple choices based primarily on individual 
considerations.” Along these lines, behavioral changes are subject to spillover-effects induced 
by observing a particular kind of behavior. 
Arguably, economic literature neglected the relevance of spillover-effects on individual be-
havior for a long time and it is only recently that economists have begun incorporating motives 
beyond the neoclassical economic theory’s assumption of own-payoff maximizing egoists 
(Akerlof, 1997).15 It seems reasonable to assume that individual behavior is impacted by other 
people’s behavior, their preferences, their sentiments and the like. As prominently stated by 
Fehr & Fischbacher (2005, p. 167), “if people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption and 
abuses of the welfare state are wide-spread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on 
taxes, take bribes or abuse welfare state institutions.” Consequently, social interaction shapes 
one’s own understanding of the world and behavior surrounding us.  
Social interactions and its resulting effects are key in driving behavioral changes. In reality, we 
constantly make use of learning from and adapting to observed behavior. The rating systems 
of, among others, Amazon, eBay, and IMDB use the principle of social learning by having in-
troduced a publicly accessible valuation system to spread the word of good and bad products 
and services. Instead of resorting to time consuming and potentially harmful trial-and-error 
                                               
14 For a rich and critical discussion on challenges relating to identifying and measuring social interactions, and avenues for 
future research, see Blume, Brock, Durlauf & Ioannides (2010). 
15 For early seminal contributions on the economics of altruism and egoism, see Becker (1976) and Becker (1981). 
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behavior, learning from others’ experience is a survival strategy that facilitates (social) Dar-
winism and the stability of cultural cohesion (Laland, 2002). Evidently, social interactions lead 
to social effects that are likely to trigger a type kind of behavior that we are particularly inter-
ested in: behavioral adaptation.  
Social effects are expected to be in place whenever events on an aggregate level interact with 
events on the individual level (Manski, 2000). Since the seminal contribution of Shelling 
(1973), a great amount of theoretical and empirical work highlighted the relevance of social 
effects in various contexts (cf. Evans, Oates & Schwab (1992), Glaeser, Sacerdote & 
Scheinkman (1996), Arcidiacono & Nicolson (2005), and Mas & Moretti (2009)). Such effects 
were also found to affect the individual’s inclination to reciprocate behavior positively, conse-
quently suggesting that social effects are of concern in trust relations (cf. Mittone & Ploner 
(2011)).  
In the fields of psychology, economics and sociology there exists a long tradition emphasizing 
the impact of peers on individual behavior. Research efforts gave rise to a more extensive 
investigation of peer effects on behavior such as group norms (Sherif, 1936), bandwagon ef-
fects (Asch, 1951), conformity and social influence (Kelman, 1958), obedience to authority 
(Milgram, 1974), social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980), social norms (Elster, 1989), social networks 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994), tax morale (Frey, 1997), moral identity (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000) 
and social capital (Putnam, 2000).  
In sum, understanding why and how behavioral adaptation matters and how this is shaped by 
social interactions and its resulting social effects not only helps to understand the world 
around us but also facilitates the inception of policy measures that are more promising and 
target-aimed. Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004, p. 90) put it this way: “…if one person’s level of 
education increases his neighbor’s education through dissemination of learning, then it makes 
sense to subsidize education. There is a socially desirable spillover that should be subsidized. 
However, different policy implications appear if one person’s level of education increases his 
neighbor’s education for signaling reasons – namely, as one person gets more education the 
other person must also get more education or be thought inferior. In that case, there is a 




3.3 What We Know: On Peers, Behavioral Adaptation, and Neighborhood 
Effects 
Because the ability to induce salient social identity in an artificial lab setting is instrumental to 
the study of the posed interaction between social proximity and behavioral contagion, existing 
research has focused on field rather than lab experiments. However, Angrist (2014) argues 
that many field studies on peer-effects potentially suffer from endogeneity, self-selection, and 
confounds resulting from confusing the relevant subjects with their peers. Correlations might 
arise without any causation simply indicating a spurious relationship. Angrist (2014) points out 
that these challenges make it extremely difficult to disentangle correlation from causation and 
he thus calls for a controlled approach in the lab where relevant characteristics can be varied 
exogenously. In addition to problems arising from correlated unobservables and endogenous 
group membership, Manski (1993) also prominently coined the term “reflection problem”, 
which results from the challenge of clearly disentangling the mutual influence peers exhibit 
on each other’s behavior. Such a cyclical relationship between observed and actual behavior 
poses a huge challenge for studying peer effects in the field (Manski, 2000). Beyond identifi-
cation issues, it has proven difficult to define appropriate peer groups and link them reliably 
to one another in the field. 
This chapter is devoted to provide a state-of-the-art overview of existing research that has 
convincingly provided results on peer effects. We approach the discussion of existing research 
on behavioral adaptation by subdividing the literature based on its methodological approach, 
that is: evidence from the field or from the lab.16 Although behavioral adaptation can be the 
result of various mechanisms, the economic literature (and especially its experimental subset) 
has put emphasis on studying peer effects, which is accepted as a term more broadly including 
the different mechanisms that we discussed previously. While this discussion is by far not ex-
haustive, we will concentrate mainly on experimental studies focusing on the relevance of 
peer effects in driving one’s behavior that are most relevant to our study.17 
Evidence from the Field 
                                               
16 Beyond question, previous research on peer effects not using experiments but rather observational data has been utterly 
important to today’s research. However, for reasons discussed by Manski (1993) mentioned earlier, our literature discussion 
focuses on controlled field or lab experiments. For a discussion of empirical studies on peer effects, see Angrist (2014). 
17 In chapter 3, we will introduce and discuss different concepts from the fields of economics and (social) psychology that 




A comprehensive line of research suggests that peers decisively affect individual behavior. 
Several field experiments have investigated the change of individual contribution levels in re-
sponse to the observation of other people’s contribution decisions (cf. Frey & Meier (2004), 
Laundry et al. (2006), Croson & Shang (2008), Shang & Croson (2008)). However, Zafar (2011) 
argues that those results can be explained by at least two mechanisms working simultane-
ously: the individual’s drive to conform to an underlying social norm or as a response to up-
dated beliefs concerning the charity’s quality.  
For this reason, existing literature attempts to tackle the topic of behavioral spillovers from 
various angles to better understand the channels at work. For example, Ploner (2013) investi-
gates whether peer’s behavior affects intertemporal consumption choices at a university’s 
cafeteria. He finds positive evidence for the existence of peer effects on individual decision-
making. Mas & Moretti (2009) argue that peers substantially affect a worker’s productivity 
levels positively (see also Azmet & Ichiberri (2010)). Bandiera & Rasul (2006) find that the 
farmers in Northern Mozambique condition their decision to adopt a new crop on the choices 
of their family and friends. Interestingly, they find an inverse U-shaped relationship suggesting 
that the observed social effects are positive if their social network contains few adopters and 
negative if a certain threshold is overstepped. The study of Sacerdote (2001) highlights that 
among college roommates, peers have an impact on grade point averages and the willingness 
to join fraternities. Ichino & Maggi (2000) find empirical evidence for shirking behavior within 
organizations, in particular for the case of a large Italian bank. They find a close relationship 
between an individual’s absenteeism with the rate of absenteeism of co-workers. Cialdini et 
al. (1990) and Mas & Moretti (2009) show that the observation of another person’s behavior 
leads to less littering in public places and higher productivity.  
Along the lines of a more delinquent context, Wilson & Kelling (1982) have outlined the inter-
dependence of disorder and criminality within a society, introducing the terminology of the 
‘Broken Windows Theorem’. Here, a broken window can function as a signal transmitting the 
understanding that social norms exist and tolerate fraudulent behavior. Social preferences 
and contextual information decisively affect one’s understanding about what is seemingly ap-
propriate in a given social context, thus shedding light on individual behavior from a compre-
hensive perspective (see Beckenkamp et al. (2014) for an experimental analysis). Another ex-
ample for peer effects in the unethical domain is discussed by Gould & Kaplan (2011). Here, 
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the authors examined peer effects for the use of performance enhancing drugs for baseball 
players.  
An extensive line of controlled experiment-in-the-field research focusing on neighborhood ef-
fects has been triggered by the seminal papers of Case & Katz (1991) in which they found 
evidence for criminal behavioral contagion both within families and neighborhoods in the Bos-
ton area. Ever since, multiple research projects have examined the short- and long-run effects 
of the Moving-to-Opportunity (MTO) project in which families are eligible to participate in a 
lottery for vouchers that would potentially help them to move to a better and safer neighbor-
hood. Since 1994, this project has been in place in five cities: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, and New York City. Along these lines, Katz, Kling & Liebman (2001) examined the 
short-run effects of the MTO project on the well-being of the families who were offered a 
voucher. Their findings indicate a substantial improvement of well-being along different di-
mensions, including increased safety, and improved health conditions both mentally and phys-
ically. Surprisingly, especially young men were susceptible to the neighborhood change, while 
the young women’s disobedience remained invariant.  
With the ability to capitalize on a more extensive continuity of data, the studies by Kling, Lud-
wig & Katz (2005) and Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007) support previous results of an asymmetric 
assimilation process across gender. For criminal behavior, Kling, Ludwig & Katz (2005) find a 
strong gender effect. In terms of reduced arrests for violent crimes, men react positively to 
improved living conditions in the short-run. In the long-run, however, these effects vanish. 
Opposite to what can be expected from moving to a better neighborhood, males’ general 
problem behavior and property crime arrest soar irrespectively. Conversely, females’ criminal 
behavior decreases. The findings of Kling, Liebman & Katz (2007) indicate that although nei-
ther adult’s economic self-sufficiency nor physical health conditions benefited from the MTO 
program, the mental health improvements for both adults and the female youth were sub-
stantial. What is more, the beneficial effects on education, risky behavior, and physical health 
that were found on the side of females were fully offset by the negative effects on the side of 
males, thus yielding limited contentment of the MTO initiative based on its overall impact. In 
a very recent study on the MTO program, Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015) find strong evidence 
for positive income effects for children who were young (age 13 or younger) when their par-
ents moved. Surprisingly, the same effects are either non-existent or even negative in the 
long-run for children who were older than 13 when they moved. The findings indicate that the 
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marginal gains from the MTO program decrease with the children’s age, possibly due to dis-
ruption effects and social alienation. Although such findings are in line with literature suggest-
ing that the duration of exposure of children to better environments is predictive of the treat-
ment effect’s magnitude, the results dampen the overall expedience of the MTO program (for 
a discussion see Chetty, Hendren & Katz (2015)).  
Capitalizing on a different but comprehensive dataset that includes the assignment of refugee 
immigrants to Denmark from 1986 to 1998, Damm & Dustmann (2014) find that the share of 
convicted young people in the neighborhood significantly increases both the probability for a 
male’s convictions later in life and the total number of convicted crimes that were executed 
by men. Their findings suggest that the spillover-effects of neighborhood crime are distinc-
tively linked through the channel of social interaction, which is, however, only true for youth 
criminal behavior. Because the assignment of the refugee immigrants in their sample was 
quasi-random, this paper draws on a spatial allocation experiment that does not involve deal-
ing with issues such as endogenous neighborhood selection and thus strengthens the validity 
of their findings. Bursztyn et al. (2014) used a high-stakes field experiment in Brazil to study 
different mechanisms of peer effects. In particular, their design allowed them to disentangle 
two typically confounded channels of social influence in the context of financial decisions, 
which are social learning (learning from the peer’s choice) and social utility (derived utility 
from the peer possessing the same asset).18 In terms of economic and statistical significance, 
their findings indicate that social influence is transmitted through both channels and point in 
the same direction. 
Some studies, however, find little evidence for neighborhood or peer effects. In a highly re-
garded study, Evans, Oates & Schwab (1992) show that after controlling for selection bias, any 
measurable peer effect on teenage pregnancy and school dropout rates disappear. While be-
ing careful in not claiming that no peer effects exist at all, they rather point critically to meth-
odological issues measuring peer effects in a clean way. Angrist & Lang (2004) use data from 
the Metropolitan Council for Opportunity (Metco) desegregation program in which mostly 
black students are sent to more affluent suburbs. Their findings indicate that there are little, 
if at all, positive spillovers on students. Similarly, Burke & Sass (2013) find little evidence of 
classroom peer effects on student achievement for Florida public school students. Likewise, 
                                               




Ludwig & Kling (2007) find little evidence for the contagion of crime hypothesis using MTO 
data. Instead, their findings indicate that crime rates are merely driven by neighborhood racial 
segregation.  
In conclusion, the existence of peer effects is up for scholarly debate, which is mainly driven 
by methodological challenges and data problems. However, in following Angrist (2014), the 
previously discussed MTO program yields the most promising setting to study clean peer ef-
fects in the field. Previous research that utilized MTO data yields, among other things, strong 
gender asymmetries in terms of the evolution of criminal behavior. By common consent, the 
authors suggest that these findings can be attributed to differences in which males and fe-
males respond to their environment and its influences. Ultimately, this leads to differences in 
magnitude and speed at which (illicit) behavior is picked up.  
 
Evidence from the Lab 
In what follows, we shall not attempt to provide an exhausting overview of the comprehensive 
literature dealing with peer effects in general. Instead, we will focus on a range of influential 
studies using lab experiments to shed light on mechanisms relating to behavioral spillovers 
that are more in line with our paper’s focus. Later in the paper, we will refer to these studies 
in more detail where necessary. 
Over the last decade, a comprehensive stream of literature studying spillover-effects and be-
havioral adaptation in the lab has emerged that complement the ongoing important work in 
the field. As discussed previously, the methodological shift was strongly driven by challenges 
relating to identifying these effects in a clean way using observational data. Several research-
ers claim that although the most recent generation of studies measuring such effects with 
observational data has succeeded to make important steps towards tacking the challenges 
outlined before, controlled lab experiments are still the gold standard in reducing noise and 
potential confounds (Angrist, 2014). “However, even if the setting offers an almost perfect 
opportunity to identify peer effects in many of these studies, the impossibility of controlling 
for all local or personal confounding factors and for endogenous sorting makes the identifica-
tion strategy not fully convincing" (Falk & Ichino, 2006, p. 40).  
Early laboratory research studying peer effects and social identification jointly has been pio-
neered by Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996) and Bohnet & Frey (1999). These studies made 
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use of variation in the instruction’s wording or enhanced face-to-face communication to study 
the role of social identification in giving decision, equivocally finding support for its relevance 
(see also Charness & Gneezy (2008)). We will return to these studies in more detail in chapter 
5. 
Other studies have looked into peer effects in productivity decisions. In a highly regarded 
study, Falk & Ichino (2006) found robust evidence for the existence of peer effects in a produc-
tivity task. Their results indicate that low-productivity workers are particularly susceptible to 
peer effects, which results in an over-proportional raise in productivity. Following the work of 
Mas & Moretti (2009), subsequent studies tried to disentangle the naturally occurring chan-
nels of simultaneously observing peers and being observed by peers. For the most part, these 
studies found the latter channel to be more effective than the former in boosting productivity 
(cf. Georganas, Tonin & Vlassopolous (2013); for exceptions see Veldhuizen, Oosterbeek & 
Sonnemans (2014)). 
Along the lines of studying behavior in the workplace, Gächter et al. (2012) set up an experi-
ment that investigates reciprocal behavior under observability of other people’s actions. They 
find that the individual’s extent to comply with norms of reciprocity is significantly driven by 
both pay and effort comparison information. Zafar (2011) experimentally examines charitable 
giving in a social context. He finds that by systematically revealing information, both the learn-
ing about descriptive norms (through observing what others do) and the image-related con-
cerns (through revealing own behavior to the reference group) drive individual contribution 
levels. In a more delinquent context, Falk & Fischbacher (2002) investigate peer effects in the 
form of conditional stealing behavior. In particular, they investigate whether an individual’s 
inclination to steal is dependent on other peer’s stealing behavior. Their main findings suggest 
that, on the aggregate level, people make stealing decisions conditional on the behavior of 
their peers.  
In economics, a limited number experimental research has also pointed at the contagion of 
both selfish behavior and dishonesty. Bicchieriy and Xiao (2009) study a dictator game with 
varying information on other participant’s selfish or fair behavior, finding that fairness in ac-
tions is contagious. More to the point of our research, Innes & Mitra (2013) use a variant of 
Gneezy’s (2005) deception game to study whether dishonesty breeds dishonesty. Their find-
ings suggest that the beliefs about other’s dishonesty is indeed contagious, potentially driven 
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by the wiggle-room created by such social cues and thus representing a justification device for 
one’s personal dishonest behavior. 
 
4. Drivers of Behavioral Contagion: An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
Prior to delving into the subject in more detail, some effort will be made to disentangle many 
of those existing concepts explaining why and under which circumstances people demonstrate 
a change in behavior as a function of their peer’s behavior.  In both economics and psychology, 
several concepts have been developed over the past few decades referring to similar and of-
ten the same reasoning to change one’s own behavior.19 The complexity of the self and the 
dependency of one’s own behavior on what one observes of peers has received a lot of schol-
arly attention (cf. Baumeister (1987), Kahneman & Tversky (2009)). It is thus important to shed 
light on the underlying concepts driving behavioral adaptation. In this context, we will differ-
entiate between concepts that originated in the (I) economic literature and in the (II) literature 
of (social) psychology.20 The economic concepts include (I.1) social decisions and social dis-
tance (Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), (I.2) image related concerns (Bernheim, 
1994), (I.3) taste for conformity (Bernheim, 1994), and (I.4) imitation (Alós-Ferrer & Schlag 
(2009), Sliwka (2007)). In addition, we also discuss some (social) psychological concepts in-
cluding (II.1) social learning (Bandura (1971)), (II.2) norms (Cialdini et al. (1990), Bicchieri 
(2006)), and (II.3) psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty (Aron & Aron (1986), Gold-
stein & Cialdini (2007)). 
One point is worth clarifying. In this paper, we shall not attempt to settle the argument which 
scholarly approach explains behavior best. Rather, for our purpose, we will use the previously 
defined unifying terms behavioral adaptation or behavioral contagion throughout the paper 
in order to refer to one person’s decision to change initial behavior as a function of observed 
behavior from at least one other person. Using this umbrella term will allow us to focus on 
what is relevant without getting lost in conceptual debates. We deem it important to help 
understand the role social proximity plays in the change of behavior and to what extent prox-
imity mediates the spillover of ethical and unethical behavior.  
                                               
19 See discussion in chapter 3. 




It will be the next sub-chapters’ aim to dissect the different approaches in more detail and to 
explain the reasons why this is the case. At times, the predictions and the empirical outcomes 
are identical, but the underlying forces causing such outcomes are diverse. In what follows, 
we will discuss the different theories outlined above and their implications with respect to 
changes in behavior. At the end of this chapter, we will relate these theories to our experiment 
and provide a systematic breakdown with respect to the fit of each particular theory to explain 
behavior in our design.21  
 
4.1 Concepts in Economics 
4.1.1 Social Decisions and Social Distance 
Seminal contributions by Akerlof (1997) and Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004) were among the 
first to provide an economic framework highlighting the relevance of social distance in affect-
ing social interaction and behavioral adaptation. Beyond rationalizing one’s own behavior in 
an isolated environment, research indicates that behavior is a function of both pure own-max-
imizing and other-regarding concerns. 
For a while, traditional economics has neglected such interdependence and rather put em-
phasis on individualism. In reality, however, decisions are rarely brought about in total isola-
tion, but are rather the result of an interplay with one’s (social) environment. Arguably, indi-
viduals care about both status concerns (in absolute and relative comparisons) and other’s 
well-being (Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), Charness & Rabin (2002)). Be-
cause social interactions typically render externalities with the potential of slowing down con-
version towards socially (un-)desirable equilibria, it is important to understand the underlying 
mechanism.  
In his attempt to explain the connection between social interaction and behavioral adaptation 
(conformity, in particular), Akerlof (1997) made use of the Newtonian theory of gravity. Aker-
lof’s approach centers on explaining conformist behavior as a function of distance in the social 
space. Such difference in one’s social space is characterized by the difference in behavior be-
tween oneself and a person or group of relevance. For his purpose, Akerlof applies the con-
cepts of a gravity model allowing him to argue that conformity leads to benefits (e.g. higher 
                                               
21 It is worth noting, however, that our discussion here will be purely descriptively. We will contrast the explanatory power 
of these concepts within the frame of our experiment in chapter 6.  
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individual utility or gains from trade) that are negatively correlated with distance in social 
space.22 Akerlof puts a reduced form concept forward in which one’s utility declines as the 
individual’s behavior deviates from the behavior of others. Assuming the existence of repre-
sentative agents, his model predictions yield a set of equilibria in which the ultimate behavior 
of all individuals is the same, thus clearly characterizing the behavior of every party.23  
Ultimately, in order to maximize one’s intrinsic utility, the individual will converge towards the 
observed behavior and thus reduces the existing social distance.24 With reduced distance, so-
cial interactions become more favorable through facilitation of e.g. mutually beneficial trade. 
 
4.1.2 Image Related Concerns 
In understanding individual behavior, one fundamental question arises: “How much of what 
we do is the result of our genetic code (nature); and how much of it is a function of our envi-
ronment, including the actions of those around us and our own past actions (nurture)?” 
(Cabral, 2005, p. 15). The threat of reputation loss and being punished in the case of wrong-
doing is an integral component of individual decision making in general. By weighing costs 
against benefits, the impact of possible reputation loss might deter individuals to engage in 
illicit behavior of any kind. 
Individuals are striving for social inclusion and recognition. They want to belong to one or 
more social groups and engage in social interaction. Striving for social identity is an inherent 
characteristic, thus decisively driving the individual’s yearning for maintaining an adequate 
                                               
22 Because geographic location is one determinant of social interaction, this approach is a generalization of what sociologists 
have coined “social geography”, which has been inspired by Krugman’s (1991) work on economic geography.  
23 Although ex-post behavior is uniform across individuals in equilibrium, such an approach still models conformism because 
of the ex-ante desire to be and behave like others. Akerlof also proposes an extension with individual heterogeneity that 
allows for the formation of social sub-groups with own norms and values. The extension models a mechanism in which (ran-
domly distributed) past social location for each individual is inherited. In combination with static expectations about “the 
positions to be occupied by others in social space […] such a model can portray stable groups in low level equilibrium traps 
because individual’s incentives to choose x to conform with those whose inherited social locations are close may overwhelm 
their incentives to choose x for intrinsic reasons” (Akerlof, 1997, p. 1010).  In our experiment, we will study this mechanism 
by holding the other’s behavior fixed and thus allowing for deliberate behavioral adaptation free of unstable, higher-order, 
or even nonexistent beliefs about the other person’s next move. We will return to this argument in our design section. 
24 A point not made clear in this approach is whether such desire to conform is also dependent on the signaling value of one’s 
behavioral adaptation. The model argues that the desire to conform and reduce social distance is entirely driven by intrinsic 
concerns. However, the inability to signal conformity to one’s peers runs counter to the initial concept of conformism (intro-
duced by, for example, Ash (1958) and Bernheim (1994). Thus, this concept rather resembles the ideas of imitation of pref-
erences (Sliwka, 2007) or self-expansion (Aron & Aron, 1986) that will be addressed in the next sub-chapters. 
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reputation. In this sense, losing face as the result of deviant behavior may serve as an avoid-
ance, as this might result in exclusion from the group (cf. Bernheim (1994)). Along these lines, 
Akerlof (1980) argues that the deviation from social standards might lead to loss of social rep-
utation and consequently to ostracism. However, it is worth noting that deviant behavior not 
necessarily implies bad behavior per se, but has to be understood as a deviation from the 
underlying social norm in either direction. Reputation can also work as a means to preserve a 
coherent self-image that allows keeping an internal consistency (cf. Baumeister (1998)). The 
concept of the self has multiple facets and impact behavior in different ways, as level of self-
regard and self-esteem, the extent and content of self-identity as well as the structure of the 
self-concept exhibit motivational implications (cf. Wells (1978)). By that, people try to avoid a 
negative update of their self-image through their actions, which otherwise would result in an 
internal conflict. Such a mechanism possesses the power to prevent individuals from engaging 
in delinquent behavior in the first place. This mechanism is more distinct when the group is 
salient, consequently giving rise to more extensive alignment with the group’s behavior. What 
is more, own actions could also be subject to social signaling, which highlights the perception 
of oneself by others and thus potentially triggering conform behavior (cf. Grossman (2010)). 
It is important to clearly distinguish between these two motives and mechanisms when ana-
lyzing one’s individual drivers for conform behavior.25  
However, for image related concerns to be effective, a setting of repeated interactions has to 
be in place. In a one-shot setting, the threat of a reputation loss is negligible as the players 
won’t face each other for a second time. If recurring interaction is not taking place, any deviant 
behavior can neither be traced back to the individual nor will be colored negatively with regard 
to future collaboration. Existing research supports this perspective. For example, there is com-
prehensive experimental literature pointing to the fact that contributions and compliance 
with underlying norms rise in multiple-shot interactions. In particular, this is true when trans-
parency (e.g. ability to observe other participants’ contribution decisions) or punishment (e.g. 
for non-compliance with social norms) is possible (cf. Andreoni (1995), Fehr & Gächter (2000), 
Cameron et al. (2009), Chaudhuri (2011)). Consequently, in order for reputation to be effective 
(even in absence of a punishment-mechanism), a setting of repeated interaction has to be in 
place and actions have to be observable to other people.  
 
                                               
25 These aspects will be taken into consideration in the experimental design. We will return to this point later. 
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4.1.3 Taste for Conformity 
Research and observations of real life situations indicate that underlying social factors deci-
sively influence individual behavior. Motivation for a particular behavior is driven by the in-
herent desire to be valued and to win prestige, esteem, popularity, and acceptance (Ellingsen 
& Johannesson, 2008). Arguably, both the introversive coherence and outward appreciation 
matters and can be achieved through conformity in behavior. The basic idea here is that any 
infinitesimal deviation from effective norms might be punished by the social group (Bernheim 
(1994); see also Akerlof (1980) and Tirole (1996) for related work on the role of reputation in 
individual decision making and behavioral alignment).  
In his seminal contribution, Bernheim (1994) formalized the concept of taste conformity. He 
argues that the individual’s preference for status is in line with psychological, evolutionary, 
and behavioral considerations. In particular, natural selection favors concerns for status as 
this goes hand in hand with greater opportunities for reproduction. From a behavioral point 
of view, such concerns act as a reinforcing device to form preferences for higher esteem be-
cause esteemed individuals are more likely to receive better treatment. 
Although partly representing a departure from the traditional formulation of preferences, this 
approach does not necessarily require the abandonment of consistent, self-interested optimi-
zation processes. By assuming that status depends on “public perceptions about an individ-
ual’s preferences over actions […] esteem is determined by expectations about future actions 
and that tastes and proclivities are the best predictors of future actions” (Bernheim, 1994, p. 
843).  
Unsurprisingly, research indicates that people share similar preferences and opinions within 
the same group, which can arguably be both the antecedent and the effect of social interac-
tion and norm alignment.26 Aligning with existing norms is a way to signal one’s (wishful) be-
longing to a certain social group. As argued by Hogg & Tindale (2002), enacting in-group-pro-
totypical behavior is a way to validate one’s own group membership, not only to the social 
group but also to themselves. By that, aligned behavior might function as a signal to both the 
external (e.g. the peers) and the internal world (e.g. themselves) in order to solidify the sense 
of belonging. If the individual cares about status, one has to set the right signals to the peers 
                                               
26 Manski (1993) refers to this as the previously mentioned reflection problem, rendering it extremely difficult to study clean 
peer-effects in the field. We will return to this point shortly in the experiment’s design section of chapter 6.  
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in order to create esteem. This esteem will be provided in case the individual behaves in a way 
that is expected from him. 
In this vein, Bernheim (1994, p. 844) derives the following proposition, highlighting the deci-
sion process leading to behavioral adaptation: 
“When popularity is sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility (defined as the 
utility derived directly from consumption), many individuals conform to a single, 
homogeneous standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying prefer-
ences. They are willing to suppress their individuality and conform to the social 
norm because they recognize that even small departures from the norm will seri-
ously impair their popularity.” 
Arguably, the extent at which people are willing to align with their peer’s behavior is driven 
by the degree of social identification to the social group. Social identity theory provides helpful 
guidance to distinguish between different magnitudes of personal identification with the 
peer’s behavior (cf. Tajfel & Turner (1979), Tajfel (1982)). According to this approach, people 
categorize themselves and other persons into different social groups. Membership in a group 
is defined as the social identity and individuals strive to enhance their position and self-esteem 
through actions. These actions encompass the alignment with existing group norms. “[…] the 
social identity analysis of categorization processes suggests that group cohesion or solidarity 
is not only attraction among group members, but also attitudinal and behavioral consensus, 
ethnocentrism, in-group favoritism and intergroup differentiation, and so forth – the entire 
range of effects of categorization-based depersonalization” (Hogg & Tindale, 2002, p. 65). A 
comprehensive stream of literature suggests that such identification is driven by in-group-out-
group concerns, finding that in-group favoritism is found across different contexts and social 
settings (cf. Tajfel (1982), Hoffman, McCabe & Smith (1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Eckel & 
Petrie (2011), Charness & Gneezy (2008)). From this one can derive the assumption that the 
stronger the desire to be part of the in-group, the stronger one’s intrinsic willingness to com-
ply with prevalent rules and engage in conformity by adapting social norms. Such a desire is 
driven by, for example, the inherent relevance of the social image component (cf. Andreoni & 
Bernheim (2009)). The stronger the social identity with a reference group, the stronger the 
effect of social comparison on individual conformity. Overall, taste for conformity is a function 
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of existing social identity and the extent of social comparison to one’s reference group. Devi-
ating from the group’s behavior (even in extreme cases where the group behavior is clearly 
wrong, cf. Asch (1958)) and thus being perceived as different might create discomfort in form 
of substantial disutility. 
 
4.1.4 Imitation 
In this subchapter, we will discuss two streams of literature suggesting that behavioral adap-
tation is the result of either pure behavioral imitation (e.g. due to observing behavior that 
leads to a superior outcome) or the adjustment of preferences (e.g. contingent on the behav-
ior of the peers). With no claim to completeness, this chapter’s focus will lie on the selected 
sample of contributions discussing the topics of behavioral imitation and adjustment of pref-
erence as a mechanism for behavioral adaptation. 
Pure Behavioral Imitation 
Imitation is a common behavioral trait of both animals and humans (Laland, 2002). While it is 
likely that imitation is driven by evolutionary and cultural facets, its pervasiveness can only be 
explained if it sufficiently often leads to a desirable outcome. Imitation has a number of desir-
able features because it allows one, among other things, to free ride on superior information 
(in the spirit of social learning, but see also Sinclair (1990)), to save mental resources (in the 
spirit of bounded rationality, but see also Conlisk (1980)), or as a means to be regarded similar 
to others (in the spirit of the social esteem argument, but see also Cho & Kreps (1987)). 
Along these lines, Alós-Ferrer & Schlag (2009) abstract from the standard Bayesian belief-
based approach and introduce the concept of imitation as a belief-free behavioral rule. The 
authors make the case that imitation is triggered by the observation of a superior outcome. 
In face of different imitation concepts, the degree of sophistication involved in assessing the 
extent of the observed agent’s better performance clearly dominates a simple ‘follow who-
ever performs better than me’ rule. The reason behind this argumentation is that “the reluc-
tance to switch when the observed choices are only slightly better than the own might not be 
due to switching costs, but rather to the fact that the payoff-sensitivity of the imitation rule 
allows the population to learn the best option” (Alos-Ferrer & Schlag, 2009, p. 273). In essence, 
this approach highlights the idea that behavioral adaptation can be triggered by behavioral 
imitation that results from observing (sufficiently) superior outcomes.  
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Adjustment of Preferences 
Another strain of literature models behavioral adaptation in a way that is hard to swallow by 
traditional economists: preferences are not stable per se but are subject to interrelations with 
the encompassing ecological system (cf. Sliwka (2007)). In his work, Sliwka (2007) introduced 
a third group of agents (in addition to agents of the homo oeconomicus type and agents with 
other-regarding preferences, cf. Fehr & Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000)), namely 
the ‘conformists’. Here, such conformists are stochastic learners and exert behavioral adapta-
tion through imitation of preferences.  
Such conformists find themselves in a situation of uncertainty concerning the appropriate and 
acknowledged behavior by the social group. By such definition, a conformist will then be in-
clined to adapt his own behavior if he believes that this particular behavior is represented, 
meaning sufficiently supported and performed, by other agents. Observing certain behavior 
induces learning about other peoples’ preferences, which in turn potentially triggers behav-
ioral adaptation on the side of the agent.  
Arguably, a conformist of the Sliwka-type is an agent who is driven by moral convictions and, 
although being mindful of social norms, will only be guided by them if he believes that a suffi-
ciently large subset of the relevant social group will behave in the same way. He will also suffer 
remorse only if such feelings of guilt are sufficiently represented within the social group (also 
see Kandel & Lazear (1992)). 
While classical economists might find the idea of contingent preferences hard to swallow, the 
recent years’ literature has steadily evolved modeling social preferences beyond what has 
typically been assumed to be the case for fully rational agents. This approach is backed up by 
a variety of findings indicating that individual taste is not invariant but merely subject to social 
influence (Salganik, et al., 2006), which is in line with existing psychological literature on the 
pertinence of social influence (cf. Sherif (1937), Ash (1952), and Cialdini & Goldstein (2004)). 
 
4.2 Concepts in (Social) Psychology 
4.2.1 Social Learning Theory 
Individuals constantly send signals through their behavior. These signals soak through differ-
ent channels and as such not only reveal personal preferences but also transmit information 
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about the current state-of-the-world (Anderson & Holt, 1997). Observed behavior is con-
stantly evaluated by the environment (i.e. the peers), triggering an action that is frequently 
referred to as social learning. Potentially, this allows other individuals to infer relevant infor-
mation with respect to accepted or correct behavior (cf. Banerjee (1992), Ellison & Fudenberg 
(1993), Bikhchandani et al. (1998), Bikchandani & Sharma (2000), Chari & Kehoe (2004)). 
Broadly speaking, this particular strain of literature suggests that behavioral adaptation can 
be subdivided into two fundamental mechanisms, one of which is social learning and the 
other, social utility (Bursztyn, et al., 2014)).  
Along these lines, Bandura’s (1986) Theory of Social Learning emphasizes that behavior is the 
result of what has been learned through the observation of others rather than through trial-
and-error. In particular, social learning is referred to in situations where individuals infer from 
a third party’s behavior, such as buying decision, that the product must be of high quality. This 
in turn initiates own buying decisions. With respect to financial markets, herding behavior 
based on social learning assumes that conscious actions, such as buying decisions of an asset, 
transmit a positive signal about the product’s value to the observer, thus increasing the prob-
ability that this action will be imitated. Under social learning, individuals constantly engage in 
a form of Bayesian-updating and adjust their understanding of the world.27 The current trend 
of social trading notices this development, which utilizes the power of swarm intelligence to 
carry out investment decisions on the stock market (cf. Neumann et al. (2013)). By following 
the crowd, these people anticipate some existing information asymmetry and assume that the 
ones who act are the ones who are better-informed (cf. Conlisk (1980), Bernheim (1994)). 
In sum, Bandura’s approach stresses the idea that individual behavior is driven by informa-
tional motives and that we learn from direct experience, interaction, and observation. Conse-
quently, social interaction allows individuals to learn and adapt established behavior.  
 
4.2.2 Norms 
By nature, humans are social creatures who use norms as guidance to learn what should and 
should not be done. The social context shapes the understanding and perception of existing 
                                               
27 Conversely, social utility implies that “one’s utility from possessing an asset (or product) depends directly on the possession 
of that asset (or product) by another individual.” (Bursztyn, et al., 2014, p. 2). Although of particular relevance for explaining 
behavioral traits on, among others, financial markets, this approach will not be investigated further. 
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norms, which in turn substantially affect individual behavior. Along these lines, the contribu-
tions by Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bicchieri (2006) have fueled our understanding of norms in 
general and their role in shaping social interactions.  
We start by noting that research is disunited on what exactly is meant by a social norm. In 
addition, Postlewaite (2011) argues that economists have often been reluctant to incorporate 
social aspects such as norms into their analysis, especially if the results lead to a deviation 
from the standard neoclassical predictions. This, in turn, triggers even more fragmentation 
within and among the fields of research. For our purpose, we define norms as “the result of 
shared notions of appropriate behavior and the willingness of individuals to reward appropri-
ate behavior and punish inappropriate behavior. […] As long as the rewards and punishments 
are sufficiently large, norms can stabilize a vast range of different behaviors” (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2001, p. 283). Appropriate behavior is believed to be represented by a social norm 
if “the behavior differs from that of other groups in similar environments” (Postlewaite, 2011, 
p. 32). From the perspective of game theory, Binmore (1998) adds that social life is an infinite 
game with norms representing equilibria that are in line with the folk theorem where both 
types of individuals are punished, norm violators and those who fail to punish them.28 From 
this, we can conclude that social norms sustain because individuals have, among others, “a 
desire to coordinate, [a] fear of being sanctioned, [and want to] signal membership in the 
group, or simply follow the lead of others” (Young, 2015, p. 359). 
In their seminal work, Cialdini et al. (1990) separate two types of norms that drive individual 
behavior. On the one hand, the descriptive norms induce an understanding of what is (sup-
posedly) normal and thus mirrors the status-quo. Observing other people’s behavior triggers 
a decisional shortcut as one relies on what seems to be sensible based on observed behavior. 
Conversely, the injunctive norm mirrors an individual’s beliefs about how someone (suppos-
edly) ought to behave. This norm is socially loaded and highlights what is morally approved or 
disapproved. This said, “rather than simply informing one’s actions, these norms enjoin it 
                                               
28 Boyd & Richerson (2001) provide a theoretical model explaining the mechanism of norm adaptation under the existence 
of occasional learning and inherent conformism. For an extended evolutionary perspective see McAdams (1997), Bowles & 
Gintis (2004), and Richerson & Boyd (1998). However, the question of why individuals choose to enforce norms remains open. 
We follow Boyd & Richerson (2001, p. 283) and assume “that the problem of why people choose to enforce norms has some-
how been resolved […] over the long history of human evolution.” 
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through the promise of social sanctions. Because what is approved is often what is typically 
done, it is easy to confuse these two meanings of norms.” (Cialdini, et al., 1990, p. 1015).  
In addition, Bicchieri (2006) introduces the notion of conditional preferences (preferences that 
are conditional on social expectations) and unconditional preferences (preferences that are 
purely inherent to the individual, like self- and other-regarding preferences). In terms of indi-
vidual norm compliance, Bicchieri argues that expectations are the main drivers. Here, the 
individual’s inclination to obey norms is driven by both social beliefs, which are represented 
by normative and empirical expectations, as well as by non-social beliefs, such as factual and 
personal normative beliefs. Social beliefs are represented by two sets of expectations. For one, 
normative expectations describe second order beliefs about what others think should be 
done. For another, empirical expectations represent what one expects others will do. As elab-
orated in Bicchieri & Xiao (2009), such expectation can be grounded on past observations of 
conformity or its consequences. Individual conformity is thus conditional on both belief sets. 
In turn, non-social beliefs are represented by factual beliefs (that is, beliefs about the actual 
consequences of behavior) and personal normative beliefs (that is, what one personally thinks 
should be done). “A social norm then is a collective practice sustained by empirical and nor-
mative expectations and by preferences conditional on both these expectations” (Bicchieri, et 
al., 2014, p. 4).  
Norms play an important role in everyday life and are decisive in establishing and sustaining 
social interactions. They determine the way we perceive the world and make sense out of it. 
The existence of norms provides an explanation to why and when behavior is contagious since 
individuals often follow and subordinate to the prohibition, indulgence, or encouragement of 
(un)ethical norms without much deliberation or putting it into question (Boyd & Richerson, 
2001). In addition, Boyd & Richerson (2001) suggest that the saliency of norms depends on its 
source (e.g. on whom one interacts with), thus suggesting that norm obedience is likely to be 
a function of culture in general and social proximity in particular. This sometimes leads to the 
perverse outcome of antisocial punishment, in which social behavior is punished because it 




4.2.3 Psychological Closeness and Vicarious Dishonesty 
In social psychology, there is a comprehensive stream of literature introducing concepts of 
psychological closeness and vicarious dishonesty. These concepts serve the purpose of ex-
plaining the mechanism of behavioral adaptation in various contexts. A brief discussion of the 
more prominent approaches follows. 
The self-expansion theory as proposed by Aron & Aron (1986) and extended by Aron et al. 
(1992) argues that the underlying mechanism of close relationships is defined by the inclusion 
of others in the self. In particular, the broadening of one’s self is likely to occur if we are (or at 
least feel) close to the other person. Existing research highlights a number of factors that in-
fluence one’s feelings of attachment towards other persons. Among these, sharing a common 
group membership (Tajfel, 1982), a similar name (Pelham, et al., 2005), the same birthday 
(Cialdini & DeNichols, 1989), or even imagining closeness (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007) are 
found to trigger self-expansion and thus matter for conformity to selfish or unfaithful behavior 
(Gino & Galinsky, 2012). Hence, individuals take the perspective of others, afford them “self” 
status, and are likely to adopt other people’s behavior when social closeness is imagined 
(Galinsky, et al., 2005). Along these lines, Goldstein and Cialdini (2007) argue that when close-
ness is imagined, individuals make inferences about the other person’s attributes based on 
observed behavior and reflect upon them just as if they would have engaged in the very same 
behavior themselves.  
As psychological closeness blurs the gap between self and others, such vicarious self-percep-
tion processes facilitate mimicry and render behavioral adaptation more likely the stronger 
the feelings of attachment are. In this vein, Gino and Galinsky (2012) argue and find experi-
mental support that psychological closeness to an unethically acting person creates distance 
from one’s own moral compass, thus increasing the likelihood of conformity towards unethical 
behavior.29  
 
                                               
29 More concepts emphasizing the degree of social distance between individuals as a driving factor of behavioral adaptation 
are discussed in more detail in chapter 5.1. 
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5. The Role of Social Identity and Observed (Un)Ethicality in Behavioral Conta-
gion 
5.1 Conceptual Introduction 
Beyond Becker’s (1968) seminal work on the rational criminal, recent work within the field of 
economics started implementing factors such as identity and culture into an individual’s deci-
sion framework (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). While this stream of literature does not necessarily 
yield hypotheses contradicting those generated by the rational crime economics literature, 
the inclusion of identity, morals, and reputation allows one to draw a more comprehensive 
picture of individual decision-making (Bénabou & Tirole, 2011).   
In fact, existing research points to the relevance of social identity in determining social inter-
action such as the degree of trust and reciprocity (Leider, et al., 2009). Psychologists have 
devoted decades of research efforts to the study of group identity, which is closely related to 
the concept of social identity. Group identity is a function of social identity and is driven by 
one’s identification with a social group. Sufficient identification triggers an in-group bias, indi-
cating a preference for one’s identified in-group along different dimensions (see also Gino, 
Ayal & Ariely (2009)).30 Exemplarily, Chen & Li (2009) use painting preferences as a social iden-
tity and a matching device to study charitable giving, envy, punishment, and social concerns. 
Some research has also investigated the role of social identity for cooperation (Eckel & 
Grossman, 2005) and equilibrium selection (Chen & Chen, 2011). 
Beyond the concepts explaining general behavioral adaptation that we have already discussed 
in chapter 3, some theories predict that social identity affects the magnitude of behavioral 
adaptation. Exemplarily, McLeod et al. (1966) introduced the concept of the attraction effect, 
arguing that conformity is mediated by the level of social identification between two people 
or a group. The self-expansion theory highlights that the people’s sense of the self can be 
broadened in order to include others and even more so if we feel close to them. In conse-
quence, the person’s self-bias (e.g. egoism) includes not only himself but also extends to oth-
ers (Aron & Aron, 1986). Within the framework of the vicarious self-perception theory, observ-
ing the behavior of people that are closer from a social identity perspective may induce a carry-
over effect of behavior (Goldstein & Cialdini, 2007), whereas the perspective-taking theory 
                                               
30 See Chen & Li (2009) for a comprehensive review of related literature. 
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assumes that the imagined social closeness is already sufficient to facilitate behavioral adap-
tation (Galinsky, et al., 2005).   
As has been discussed previously, psychological research has introduced a number of ways to 
proxy social identity in the lab. Due to methodological differences, existing economic research 
has resorted primarily to using rough proxies to introduce social identification in one form or 
another. Exemplarily, this has been achieved by varying the wording of the experimental in-
structions (Hoffman, et al., 1996), using face-to-face interaction (Bohnet & Frey, 1999) or 
showing pictures (Eckel & Petrie, 2011), revealing names (Charness & Gneezy, 2008), revealing 
preferences such as those for paintings (Chen & Li, 2009), and recruiting friends and family 
members (Brandts & Solà, 2010). In line with most psychological research, these studies find 
that social identity triggers in-group favoritism.  
However, two natural problems arise with these approaches to introduce social identification 
in the lab: firstly, the introduction of potential biases caused by face-to-face communication 
within the lab or letting participants interact with their kin (Roth, 1995). Exemplarily, it has 
been shown that individuals discriminate using social cues such as looks or skin color (Eckel & 
Petrie, 2011). Additional research has investigated other-regarding behavior as a function of 
social distance. Using the dictator game setting, Bohnet & Frey (1999) find that other-regard-
ing behavior is more pronounced under stronger identification. They incepted stronger iden-
tification by the use of identification prior to the dictator game. Again, their approach is only 
a rough proxy for social proximity and does not control for potential biases stemming from, 
among others, unobserved attraction effects. Secondly, and more along the lines of our ex-
periment, applying these methods to introduce social identification does not usually allow for 
a variation of social proximity beyond a simple binary outcome of no social identification ver-
sus some social identification. In our experiment, we propose a method that allows us to nat-
urally vary the degree of social identification in the lab without having to deal with the issues 
raised above. We will return to this in our design section. 
Overall, it may be stated that different streams of existing research point at the significance 
of social identity in explaining the magnitude of behavioral adaptation thus making it worth-
while to examine this topic in more detail. 
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The ethicality of observed behavior might also be decisive to the magnitude of behavioral ad-
aptation. As we will argue throughout this paper and will be explained more formally in chap-
ter 5.2.2, we expect that observations of unethical behavior render behavioral adaptation 
more likely and more extensive as compared to observations of ethical behavior. Existing em-
pirical literature on the slippery-slope effect (cf. Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)) 
as well as on the “broken windows effect” (cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, Pestieau, 
Riedl & Villeval (2015)) support this point of view.31 Arguably, the magnitude of behavioral 
adaptation is asymmetric in one direction or another, indicating that the likelihoods for adapt-
ing behavior are different when observing ethical or unethical behavior. Below, we will pro-
vide some theoretical arguments for this claim before turning to a more formal approach. 
Individuals engage in ethical and unethical behavior for all sorts of reasons and sometimes 
turn evil extremely quickly under particular circumstances (see the infamous Milgram experi-
ment (Milgram, 1963) and Zimbardo’s Stanford prison experiment (Zimbardo, 1971)). Differ-
ent perspectives are helpful in understanding one’s rationalization to engage in (un)ethical 
behavior, such as self-rationalization, obedience to norms, or active signaling to one’s peers. 
Individuals tend to rationalize their behavior with themselves while trying to avoid cognitive 
strain stemming from, among others, negative self-image updating (cf. Wells (1978), Baumeis-
ter (1998)). Here, individuals do not want to think of themselves as a bad person and thus tend 
to engage in self-deception and moral rationalization and create positive disillusions that sus-
tain a positive self-image (cf. Taylor (1989), Mazar, Amir & Ariely (2008)). “Self-deception al-
lows one to behave self-interestedly while, at the same time, falsely believing that one’s moral 
principles were upheld. The end result of this internal con game is that the ethical aspects of 
the decision “fade” into the background, the moral implications obscured” (Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004, p. 223). Arguably, by avoiding thinking of immoral acts as such, mental pro-
cesses leading to a denial of facts facilitate a person’s inclination towards unethical behavior.  
From the perspective of norm theory, the exposition of unethical behavior comes with a rela-
tively higher risk of being condemned by and excluded from the social group (Bicchieri, 2006). 
The degree to which one can behave unethically (if at all) among one’s social peers is typically 
                                               
31 Although not explicitly along the lines of (un)ethical behavior, a similar argument can be made based on the findings within 
the extensive literature on conditional cooperation and punishment (see Chaudhuri (2010) for a selective review). 
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grounded in uncertainty. Consequently, a person’s decision to engage in either ethical or un-
ethical behavior is not only simple cost-gain maximization under risk but also involves account-
ing for the inherent uncertainty. The uncertainty involves, among others, the deviation from 
what is deemed appropriate within the social group, reputation loss, and the potential exclu-
sion from the group. From a psychological perspective, engaging in unethical behavior involves 
higher costs, as one has to forcefully convince oneself that gaining personally at the expense 
of harming others is acceptable. Processes leading up to this reasoning involve, among others, 
self-deception, justification, and hypocrisy. Typically, only the acting individual profits from 
unethical behavior in (non-) monetary terms, such as stealing money, while another person is 
losing out. In turn, however, normally both individuals gain from ethical behavior such as do-
nating money: the receiving individual gains in monetary terms and the acting individual, while 
losing out in monetary terms, is (over-)compensated from a behavioral perspective by either 
the positive feelings of warm glow of giving and altruism (Becker (1974), Andreoni (1989) & 
(1990)) or social pressure (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Plausibly, to convince oneself to behave 
unethically involves more (psychological) effort than to behave ethically.  
From a signaling perspective, observing someone who is socially closer to oneself as compared 
to observing a stranger sends a more salient form of social learning about appropriate (or at 
least tolerated) behavior within the social group. This assumption is also along the lines of 
Schelling’s (1968) prominently stated “the more we know, the more we care” and a number 
of experimental results in various settings (see Eckel & Grossman (1996), Bohnet & Frey 
(1999), Charness & Gneezy (2008), and Gino & Gallinsky (2012)). The resulting resolution of 
uncertainty allows the individual to overrule their own concerns about the inappropriateness 
of unethical behavior. This stream of literature suggests that observing unethical behavior 
might trigger stronger contagion as compared to observing ethical behavior. For these and 
more reasons, we expect behavioral adaptation to be asymmetrically biased towards unethi-
cal behavior. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Model 
We extend the model introduced by Akerlof (1997) and expand the underlying concepts in a 
way that is conducive to understanding the role of social identity and the (un)ethicality of 
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observed behavior in behavioral contagion.32 Previous work put emphasis on modeling social 
interactions and behavioral adaptation as a function of distance in the social space, e.g. re-
sulting from distance in behavior and geographic location to one’s peers. We, however, shed 
light on the relevance of social distance and proximity resulting from overlapping and common 
interests and preferences in driving behavioral adaptation. Intuitively, one could reasonably 
assume that the behavior of one’s family and friends exhibits a more salient signal and thus is 
taken more strongly into consideration than observing random strangers. What is more, we 
follow the previous discussion and assume additionally an asymmetry in behavioral contagion 
depending on the ethicality of the observed behavior. This is a substantial extension to Akerlof 
(1997), where an asymmetric adaptation in behavior cannot be illustrated. 
The purpose of this section is to outline a simple reduced-form model that allows one to draw 
predictions about individual contribution decisions in the various contexts that are reflected 
by the experimental design. These predictions can then be tested empirically. The principal 
goal of this exercise is to show how behavioral contagion is mediated by social identity and 
the (un)ethicality of observed behavior and how these factors affect the adaptation gap, that 
is the difference between one’s own and observed behavior, after contagion has taken place. 
We will introduce the symmetric model first before turning to the extension. 
 
5.2.1 Symmetric Contagion 
Prior to introducing the formal model, we begin with the intuition of what the model should 
capture. The underlying idea is that individual behavior is a function of the peer’s actions and 
thus encompasses more than one’s self-referentiality. In a situation of social interaction, an 
individual is expected to face a trade-off, weighing one’s own preferences against the peer’s 
revealed preferences. To stay in Manski’s (1993) terms, social interaction and the understand-
ing that one’s own actions are reflected by the peers and thus have an impact on other (closely 
related) people shapes the individual’s willingness to engage in behavioral adaptation. The 
                                               
32 In particular, we focus on Akerlof’s (1997) quadratic utility version of the conformity model as this generates unique equi-
libria from which we can derive testable hypotheses for our experiment, which we also deem to be more in line with the 
general story of this paper. While Akerlof’s general model puts more emphasis on one’s own decisions, the quadratic utility 
model has an a priori assumption that puts one’s own and peer behavior on an equal footing with respect to how behavior 
affects individual utility. Assuming that individuals are on a continuum between extremely selfish and extremely altruistic, 
the quadratic utility approach is conclusive. It should be noted that this assumption is not crucial to our model’s predictions 
as we mainly focus on the relevance of two factors, i.e. social identity and the (un)ethicality of observed behavior, in affecting 
one’s own decisions. Thus, the equal-weight assumption is not decisive in predicting the direction in which individual behavior 
changes as a function of those two factors.   
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magnitude to which one is willing to revise one’s own initial behavior and adapt is first and 
foremost a function of the social proximity to the peer. “As a consequence, the impact of my 
choices on my interactions with other members of my social network may be the primary 
determinant of my decision, with the ordinary determinants of choice the direct additions and 
subtractions from utility due to the choice) of only secondary importance” (Akerlof, 1997, pp. 
1006-1007). It is thus reasonable to assume that the individual’s utility is subject to a relative 
evaluation of one’s own behavior and the behavior of the peers. Similar to Akerlof (1997), the 
underlying characteristic of our model is the feature that individual utility is declining with 
increasing distance between one’s own behavior and the peer’s behavior. While the aim of 
this section is to outline a model that explains changes in general behavior, we will use the 
resulting predictions to generate hypotheses in the context of (un)ethical behavior.  
In our design, we resort to a two-stage dictator game in which each individual is paired with a 
charity of his choice. Both, the individual and the charity start with an initial endowment ࡵࢉ =
ࡵ࢏ = ࡵ ∈ ℝା of equal size. At each stage ࢚ ∈ [1, 2], each individual ࢏ faces the choice, ݔ௧௜, of 
either (a) donate (part or all of) one’s own money to the charity, (b) retain the equal split, or 
(c) take away (part or all of) the charity’s money and add it to one’s own income. We will refer 
to (a) and (c) as ethical or unethical behavior, respectively. Naturally, the individual’s decision 
is of the form ࢚࢞࢏  ∈ [−I, +I ]. The only difference between both stages is the information set 
that the individual possesses about his peer’s behavior. That is, after completion of stage 1, 
the individual observes a random individual’s behavior from stage 1. At stage 2 (that is, after 
the observation), the individual is given the opportunity to revise his initial decision, if desired.  
Let ࢻ࢚. ∈ (0,1) depict the social proximity of an individual at time t. Importantly, let an indi-
vidual’s inherent attitude towards (un)ethical behavior be described by ߠ௜. That is, ߠ௜  repre-
sents the individual ࢏’s preference to give or take a particular monetary amount within the 
boundaries of one’s income in a given situation, thus being defined as ࣂ࢏ ∈ [−I, +I ]. What is 
more, let ߰௧௜௝ represent individual ࢏′ݏ prior (stage 1) or actual observation (stage 2) of individ-
ual  ࢐′ݏ (un)ethical behavior.  
(1) ࣒࢚
࢏࢐ = ൝ݔଵఫ෪ ݂݅ ݐ = 1 (ݐݎݑ݊ܿܽݐ݁݀ ݊݋ݎ݈݈݉ܽݕ ݀݅ݏݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݁݀ ݌ݎ݅݋ݎ)
ݔଵ
௝ ݈݁ݏ݁ (ݑ݌݀ܽݐ݁݀ ܾ݈݂݁݅݁ݏ)   






 ௧ܷ௜ = ܫ − ൫1 − ߙ௧ ൯ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߠ௜൯ଶ − ߙ௧ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߰௧௜௝൯ଶ 
At stage 1, individual ࢏ has no information about individual ࢐’s decision, as all participants carry 
out their decisions simultaneously. Consequently, ࢏ resorts to forming beliefs about the be-
havior of ࢐. As depicted above, individuals face a trade-off decision at stage 1, in which devia-
tion from the individual inherent characteristic ߠ௜  has to be weighed against deviating from 
one’s own beliefs about the peer’s behavior ߰௧௜௝. Because no information about the peers was 





೔ = 2ߙ௧ ∗ ൫߰௧௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ − 2 ∗ ൫ߙ௧ − 1൯ ∗ ൫ߠ௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ .
⇔ ݔ∗ = ݔ௧௜ = ߠ௜ − ߙ௧ ߠ௜ + ߙ௧ ߰௧௜௝ 





= ߰௧௜௝ − ߠ௜ 
We can infer that a change of ࢚࢞
࢏  in ࢚ depends on the social proximity (that is either a prior 





=  ൞> 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ > ߠ௜ (ݔ௧௜  ݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ ݅݊ ߙ௧ )= 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ = ߠ௜      (ݔ௧௜  ݑ݂݂݊ܽ݁ܿݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ߙ௧ )< 0 ݂݅ ߰௧௜௝ < ߠ௜  (ݔ௧௜  ݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݁ݏ ݅݊ ߙ௧ )  
In order to study the adaptation gap at stage 2, that is the difference in behavior between 
individual ࢏ and ࢐ after the second stage, one has to hold ࢐’s behavior from stage 1 constant 
while giving individual ࢏ the ability to revise his initial decision.33  
Proposition: Equation (2) provides a solution to the maximization problem and reduces the 
adaptation gap to: 
(6) หݔଶ
௜ − ߰ଶ
௜௝ห = หߠ௜ − ߙଶ ߠ௜ + ߙଶ ߰ଶ௜ − ߰ଶ௜ ห = หߠ௜ ∗ ൫1 − ߙଶ ൯ + ߰ଶ௜ (ߙଶ − 1)ห 
                                               
33 Which is exactly what we will do in our experiment. See chapter 6. 
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Observe that unlike in Akerlof’s (1997) general conformity model, this approach generates a 
unique equilibrium prediction due to restrictions put on the social proximity parameter, that 
is 0 < ࢻ࢚. < ૚ and the linear reaction function. 
Essentially, by assuming that behavioral adaptation is symmetric in either direction this indi-
cates that the gap is driven by the social proximity to the peer that one is observing: the closer 
individuals are in terms of proximity the smaller is the expected gap and the more similar is 
their behavior. An alternative interpretation is that the peer effect is stronger and leads to a 
more extensive behavioral adaptation the higher their social proximity is. 
 
5.2.2 Asymmetric Contagion 
The main purpose of the extended model is to allow for an asymmetric adaptation to unethical 
and ethical behavior. It is plausible to assume that not only observing but also starting to act 
on unethical behavior requires a different mindset and triggers other cognitive processes than 
it is the case for ethical behavior. Here, the ability to self-justify behavior depends on the 
(un)ethicality of the (observed) act to the extent that it varies the boundaries of the moral 
wiggle room (Dana, et al., 2007). Empirical support is provided by the slippery-slope effect (cf. 
Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)) as well as results on the “broken windows effect” 
(cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl & Villeval (2015)), which suggest that 
unethical behavior is likely to be more contagious than unethical behavior. 
We introduce ࢑, which represents a factor biasing behavioral adaptation towards the obser-
vation of unethical behavior. We assume that the degree of the adaptation bias depends on 
the difference between one’s own and observed unethical behavior ࣂ࢏ − ࣒࢚࢏ . With ࣒࢚࢏  still 




 ௧ܷ௜ = ܫ − ൫1 − ߙ௧ ൯ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߠ௜൯ଶ − ߙ௧ ∗ ݇ ∗ ൫ݔ௧௜ − ߰௧௜൯ଶ 
with:  
(8) ݇ = max (ߠ௜ − ߰௧௜ + 1, 1) 
This definition illustrates that whenever one’s own initial behavior is more ethical than what 
is being observed from the peer behavioral contagion is stronger than observing more behav-
ior that is more ethical. The strength of the difference in this contagion force depends on the 
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೔ = 2ߙ௧ k ∗ ൫߰௧௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ − 2 ∗ ൫ߙ௧ − 1൯ ∗ ൫ߠ௜ − ݔ௧௜൯ 
.
⇔ ݔ௧
௜ = ߠ௜ − ߙ௧ ߠ௜ + ߙ௧ ߰௧௜݇
ߙ௧ ݇ − ߙ௧ + 1  








Under these assumptions, the resulting adaptation gap looks as follows: 
(11) หݔଶ
௜ − ߰ଶ
௜ ห = |… | = ቤ− (ఏ೔ିటమ೔ )∗(ఈమ ିଵ)
൫ఈమ ௞ିఈమ ାଵ൯
మ ቤ 
We can easily see that the slightly differently appearing adaptation gap retains the same prop-
erties as in the symmetric model. In conclusion, we expect behavioral adaptation to be driven 
by social proximity with a bias towards unethical behavior. Put differently, we expect the spill-
over of unethical behavior to be more pronounced, thus leading to a stronger degeneration 
of behavior relatively to the rise of good Samaritans.  
 
6. The Experiment 
6.1 Experimental Design and Procedure 
In order to study behavioral contagion, we are mainly interested in answering two questions 
with our experimental design: first, whether individuals revise their initial behavior in light of 
observing peer behavior. Second, whether and how a behavioral change depends on both the 
ethicality of the observed behavior and the social identification with the observed peers. Our 
design draws on a unique approach to study behavioral contagion in the lab that allows us to 
account for potential confounds potentially inherent into peer effects studies as argued by 
Manski (1993) and Angrist (2014) (see Thöni & Gächter (2015) for a similar approach). In order 
to be regarded as behavioral contagion, revised behavior has to be more similar to observed 
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behavior than one’s initial behavior that one has decided upon prior to learning peer infor-
mation. That is, revision of one’s initial behavior must follow the direction of observed initial 
peer behavior.  
Our basic design follows this straightforward procedure: action – observation of a peer – re-
action.34  Consider a variant of a two-player dictator game in which the participant (dictator) 
is matched with a charity (recipient). The dictator’s action space entails taking away money 
from the charity, leaving the initial situation unchanged, or give money to a self-chosen charity 
(the basic design follows List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)). In following Eckel & Grossman 
(1996), we use a charity to increase the saliency of the involved decisions. The experiment is 
played one-shot with a possibility to revise one’s initial behavior. Between the initial decision 
and potential revision, individuals are given the opportunity to observe the initial behavior of 
another random participant. Alongside the actual behavior, treatment variations include the 
alteration of unveiled social proximity information of the observed participant.35 That is, in 
addition to learning actual behavior and the amount that was taken away or given by this 
participant, additional information on the participant’s social proximity to oneself is varied 
with the random treatment assignment.  The treatment variation lies in the information given 
about the social proximity to the observed peers: no information on proximity (Baseline), as 
well as high proximity (T1) and low proximity (T2) information. Proximity is calculated based 
on overlapping answers in the list of statements used in the beginning of each session and 
then presented to the participants in the form of below- or above-average proximity infor-
mation to the observed peer.36 We capitalize on a shortened 25 items list of statements com-
piled from a major US American dating website to ensure the validity of the questions in suc-
cessfully matching people (see Gibbs, Ellison & Heino (2006) and Hitsch, Hortaçsu & Ariely 
                                               
34 Note that in order to exclude any hedging concerns throughout the whole experiment, information about the specifics of 
the design were only provided where necessary in order to reach a deliberate decision. That is, at Stage 1 participants were 
neither aware of the possibility to observe peers later on nor to revise their initial decision, ensuring unbiased initial behavior. 
35 Henceforth, we will use the terms social proximity and social identity interchangeably. 
36 The implementation of the low- and high-proximity information followed a very straightforward calculation. For each par-
ticipant of the active group, an individual proximity score to both participants of the passive group was calculated based on 
overlapping answers in the list of statements. From each active participant’s individual perspective, the passive participant 
with the higher (lower) score was labeled as the high (low) proximity peer. In fact, this calculation approach allows for the 
same passive person to be of high (low) proximity to one active person, while being of low (high) proximity to another active 
person, thus truly randomizing information. We abstained from providing explicit matching scores or percentages to retain 
maximum control. In addition, this allows us to alleviate the false-consensus effect, in which people systematically overesti-
mate the degree of similarity to others. The provision of social cues of this kind allows the participants to update their beliefs 
reliably with respect to the actual degree of similarity. See Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008, p. 995) for a discussion. 
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(2010) for a discussion).37 Since the business concept of dating websites is based on achieving 
high matching success rates, the use of such validated questions improves the success of in-
cepting social identification between participants in the lab.38 
The experimental procedure is represented by a single iteration of the following three stages: 
First Stage - The Action: Starting with an equal distribution of money, each individual decides 
whether to (i) donate own money to the charity’s account, (ii) not change the initial equal 
distribution, or (iii) take money from the charity and add to one’s own account.  
Second Stage – The Observation: Each active player observes one passive player of random 
who has engaged in either ethical or unethical behavior. In all three treatments, the exact 
information entails the monetary amount taken away from or given to the charity. Except for 
the baseline condition, observers received additional information related to the social identity 
to the observed peer, stating simply that based on the initial answers this peer is of higher or 
lower proximity as compared to the other passive peer that one cannot observe. 
Third Stage – The Reaction: After observation, the active player is given the choice to revise 
his initial decision.  
The experiment was concluded with a battery of non-incentivized questions to elicit attitude 
towards, among others, charitable giving and risk. 
Our design accounts for the aforementioned reflection problem by randomly assigning all par-
ticipants into two groups: active and passive. The group assignment is relevant to the action 
space available to the participants. If assigned to the active group, the participant is in the role 
of the observer and receives the opportunity to revise his initial decision. If assigned to the 
passive group, the participant is in the role of the observed person and is neither allowed to 
observe others nor to revise his own initial decision. In other words, in the active group, par-
ticipants are free to request information about the behavior of one randomly chosen peer 
                                               
37 We should stress the fact that we report lower-bound results. We induce social proximity in a very simple way by providing 
participants with either the high- or low-proximity signal in the social identification treatments 1 and 2. Although this ap-
proach allows us to provide a comprehensive set of information to induce even more salient and distinct forms of social 
identity (i.e. by providing the exact matching score, the exact answers to the questions, letting participants put different 
weights on questions according to their individual importance and so on), we resort to  this easy-to-use-easy-to-reproduce 
approach. See Appendix B for the exact list of questions used in our experiment. 
38 In addition, we elicit the strength of social identity to the observed peer using a variant of the self-evaluation scale of one’s 
social identity following Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) to verify the robustness of our social identity implementation approach. 
The non-parametric and regression estimations yield the same overall results both in direction and in magnitude.  
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following their initial decision and are then given the chance to revise. Whereas in the passive 
group, the participant’s initial behavior is held fixed and no further decisions are made.  
Payoff structure: Importantly, to exclude any form of strategic interaction that might poten-
tially dilute results or affect the saliency, the participant’s decisions only affected one’s own 
and the chosen charity’s payments but not those of other participants. That is, each individ-
ual’s decision had no monetary impact on other individuals, therefore a change in behavior 
was due purely to behavioral contagion and not due to other-regarding concerns.39 This be-
comes even more salient by randomly picking one of the individuals at the end for which the 
behavioral decision was implemented, while everyone else received a flat income irrespective 
of his actual behavior. In monetary terms, each participant and the respective charity received 
the ECU equivalent of 15 Euro, thus allowing a participant to leave with a maximum (mini-
mum) of 30 (0) Euro if the participant decided to take away all the money from (give all the 
money to) the charity. In order to increase the saliency of ethical behavior, we added a multi-
plier to the setting. That is, the experimenter doubled all Euro remaining in the charity’s ac-
count at the end of the experiment. After all decisions have taken place, one participant was 
chosen at random and the respective decision was implemented with respect to taking from 
or giving to the charity, while every other participant in the session received a flat income of 
7.50 Euro including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro. 
Several points are worth noting. In order to retain maximum control and reduce heterogeneity 
in observed behavior, in each session exactly two participants were chosen at random as pas-
sive (that is, being observed by peers), while participants randomly chosen as being active 
(that is, observing peers) always observe only one of these two passive players. What is more, 
the treatment differences are based solely on the social proximity information. Importantly, 
the observing peers received the information that a random draw will determine whether 
they will observe a high or low proximity peer and that this person would have either taken 
money away from or given money to the charity. The observer would then randomly learn the 
behavior of exactly one passive player but was never able to infer other participants’ behavior 
from this information, neither active nor passive.40 This double-random procedure ensured 
                                               
39 To some degree, the experimental design resembles the theoretical considerations of Alós-Ferrer & Schlag (2009). 
40 Prior to the actual observation, we elicited incentivized beliefs about the behavior of the two passive participants. Those 




that each active player’s information set would be restricted to the peer’s observed behavior 
and focus the participant’s attention on processing this information. In addition, to allow for 
perfect comparability across treatments, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
three treatments within the same experimental session. In sum, this design allows us to meas-
ure clean peer effects every time a participant revises his/her initial decision after observing 
peer behavior.41 The design is illustrated below: 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
                                               
41 With reference to the different concepts in economics and (social) psychology explaining behavioral contagion (as discussed 
in chapter 4) and in light of our design, some theories are better at explaining behavior in our experiment than others are. 
Contagion observed in our experiment is likely to be explained by the theories of social decisions and social distance (Akerlof 
(1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)), imitation of preferences (Sliwka, 2007), as well as by some of the theories in (social) 
psychology, such as social learning (Bandura, 1971), norms (Cialdini et al. (1990) and Bicchieri (2006)) and self-expansion 
(Aron & Aron, 1986). Other theories are not applicable due to reasons of absence of learning better outcomes (which is 
required by Alós-Ferrer & Schlag’s (2009) imitation concept), or the ability to not only observe but also be observed by the 
peers (which is required by, among others, Bernheim’s (1994) theory on taste for conformity). While it is questionable 
whether it is possible at all, we shall not attempt to disentangle clearly, which theory best explains behavioral contagion 




In order to generate hypotheses that are sound with existing theory, we derive our theoretical 
model as it is discussed in chapter 5 and our predictions from previous research.42 The slip-
pery-slope argument (cf. Gino & Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)) as well as results on 
the “broken windows effect” (cf. Beckenkamp et al. (2014), Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl & Villeval 
(2015)) suggest that unethical behavior is likely to be more contagious than unethical behav-
ior. We thus derive our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1:  Unethical behavior is more contagious than ethical behavior.  
Previous research indicates that social identification is a decisive predictor of behavior in dif-
ferent contexts related to charitable giving, trust, punishment, and reciprocity (cf. Leider et al. 
(2009), Chen & Li (2009)). What is more, some of the existing research on neighborhood ef-
fects (cf. Damm & Dustmann (2014)) and our theoretical predictions from chapter 4.2 support 
these assumptions. Consequently, we formulate our second hypothesis: 
H2: Social identification amplifies the contagion of behavior in general and uneth-
ical behavior in particular.  
We are also concerned with understanding the main driver of behavioral contagion by an-
swering whether the unethicality of observed behavior or social identification to one’s peers 
is a stronger predictor of behavioral contagion. While different streams of research suggest 
the relevance of both channels individually, we are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to 
compare these channels in terms of their impact on the magnitude of behavioral contagion. 
We follow the existing research on social identity (cf. Tajfel (1982), Hoffman, McCabe & Smith 
(1996), Bohnet & Frey (1999), Eckel & Petrie (2011), Charness & Gneezy (2008)) and expect 
behavioral contagion to be more pronounced the higher the social identification with one’s 
peer is, independent of the (un)ethicality of the observed behavior. We thus derive our final 
hypothesis: 
H3:  Social identification is the main driver of behavioral contagion. 
                                               
42 Our hypothesis will mainly focus on two behavioral traits that we can observe in our experiment: the first is individual ࢏’s 
revised amount after observing a peer’s initial decision: ࢞૛࢏ . The second is the adaptation gap of individual ࢏ and ࢐ after ࢏’s 
revision decision: ห࢞૛࢏ −࣒૛࢏ ห. We will capitalize on these two aspects to support our hypotheses in the results section. 
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In what follows, we will present and discuss the results to our hypotheses 1-3. 
 
6.3 Results and Discussion 
We conducted the experiment at the BaER-Lab at the University of Paderborn, Germany. Par-
ticipants were recruited using ORSEE (2004). We used zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) to run our 
experiment. In sum, 227 participants throughout 9 sessions were randomly assigned to one of 
the three main treatments (no proximity, high proximity, and low proximity) as well as to one 
of the two sub-treatments (observing either ethical or unethical behavior).43 Each session 
lasted about 45 minutes and the hourly average earnings were €10.50. What is more, an av-
erage of €30 was donated per session to various charities.44  
Figure 1 details our behavior data in two ways: before observation in pooled form and after 
observation by treatment. Starting with a descriptive observation, we observe some hetero-
geneity across treatments in terms of the distribution of (un)ethical behavior. On the x-axis, 
we depict the amount of money that was allocated to the charity. The point of departure is 
300, which represents the equal a priory distribution of money between the participant (300) 
and the charity (300). Thus, any value below (above) 300 depicts the individual taking from 
(giving to) the charity’s account.  
Prior to observing peer’s behavior, decisions are mainly clustered at 300 ECU, which repre-
sents the decision to not change the initial equal distribution between oneself and the charity. 
Across all treatments, a total of 25% of participants decided to revise his/her initial decision. 
After the observation, however, we find a perceptible skewness towards unethical behavior, 
particularly in the high proximity condition. Although observing either ethical or unethical be-
havior is equally likely, this finding provides us with a first indication that taking (unethical 
behavior) is more contagious than giving (ethical behavior). We will return to this argument 
shortly in our hypothesis H1.  
                                               
43 Out of the 227 participants, 18 (8%) participants were randomly assigned to being observed and thus remained passive 
after their initial decision, and 24 (11%) decided to opt-out and not to observe peer behavior. The latter represents a signifi-
cant portion of participants that refuse to learn about peer behavior and thus speak to the aforementioned problem of forcing 
participants to observe peers. See chapter 5.1 for discussion. In total, this leaves us with 185 observations entering our anal-
ysis. 




Figure 2: Incidence of choices to not change the initial equal distribution / give money to / take money from 
the charity before and after peer observation. The horizontal axis depicts a continuum of ECU left in the 
respective charity’s cash account, with 300 representing the starting allocation. The choices were clustered 
in the figure for the sake of readability. The vertical axis depicts the fraction of participants indulging in the 
particular behavior. 
 
Next, we turn to testing our hypotheses.45 We are interested in whether unethical behavior is 
more contagious than ethical behavior. We will do so by illustrating the amount revised (%) 
after observation purely depending on the (un)ethicality of observed behavior.46 More 
specifically, for the amount revised (%), the results suggests that the (un)ethicality of observed 
behavior indeed affects the individual’s revision decision. When observed ethical (unethical) 
behavior, meaning that participants observed a peer who gave money to (took money from) 
the charity, participants gave on average 6.42% more (17.3% less) money to the charity as 
compared to their initial behavior prior to having observed a peer’s behavior. The results are 
significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = 4.365) and indicate a change in behavior almost three 
                                               
45 In general, non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) specifications are used throughout this paper to test for differences 
among those who decided to revise initial behavior. Unless noted otherwise, these findings are robust to alternative non-
parametric specifications, such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and varying examinations of missing observations.  
46 For amount revised (%), a positive (negative) value implies that individual ࢏ has given more money to (has taken more 
money from) the charity as compared to his/her initial behavior prior to observing a peer’s behavior. Robustness checks 
involve the analysis of differences in the adaptation gap (%). For adaptation gap (%), a value below (above) 1 implies that the 
adaptation gap, denoted as หݔଶ௜ − ߰ଶ
௜௝ห, has gotten smaller (larger) after individual ࢏ had the chance to revise his/her initial 
decision. A value of exactly 1 means that the adaptation gap remained the same after the revision stage as compared to the 
initial decision. This could be either due to individual ࢏ deciding not to revise his/her initial decision or due to a revision which 
is equidistant in monetary terms. The results support H1 and are presented in Appendix A. 
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times as large when unethical behavior was observed as compared to ethical behavior. The 
results are highly suggestive of unethical behavior being more contagious. Thus, these results 
strongly support our hypothesis H1 and confirm that unethical behavior is indeed more con-
tagious than ethical behavior independent of social identification.47 Figure 3 illustrates our 
findings. 
 
Figure 3: Amount Revised (%) and Observed (Un)Ethicality. The figure depicts the amount revised as per-
centage of one’s initial behavior. Any value above (below) zero indicates that more (less) ECU were given 
after the revision to the charity relative to one’s initial decision. The analysis is broken down into the (un)eth-
icality of observed behavior by the active participants. 
 
We are also interested in the type of behavioral contagion that is triggered by social identifi-
cation. Following hypothesis H2, we assume that social identification amplifies the contagion 
of unethical behavior in an over-proportional way as compared to contagion of ethical behav-
ior. We thus examine the role of social identification in affecting the magnitude and direction 
of revision choices. Both findings are illustrated below in figure 4. 
Our results robustly indicate that higher social identity indeed triggers stronger behavioral 
contagion, particularly contagion of unethical behavior. As social identity increases, the mag-
                                               
47 Unless noted otherwise in the results section, we obtain similar results in terms of evidence and significance when using 
absolute ECU numbers instead of percentages. 
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nitude of revised behavior increases as well, peaking at -29.8% for the high proximity condi-
tion. The differences in behavior are significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = 4.759) when 
comparing behavior in the unknown proximity with the high proximity condition. Likewise, the 
results are significant at the 1% level (p = 0.000, z = -3.448) when comparing the high proximity 
with the low proximity condition. Here, again, the negative numbers of amount revised sug-
gest that, in terms of magnitude of revised behavior, unethical behavior is strongly pro-
nounced and thus more contagious than ethical behavior. Overall, we find ample support for 
our hypothesis H2 and thus conclude that the magnitude of a revision of one’s initial behavior 
is indeed strongly correlated with social identification. 
Consistent with our theoretical model, the results also yield strong support for the idea that 
the reduction in the adaptation gap is driven by social identification. As predicted by ߙ.௜௝, the 
stronger the social identification to one’s peer is a robust predictor (all at the 1% level) of one’s 
adaptation gap to the observed peer after observation. By the numbers, we obtain p = 0.000 
and z = 6.104 (p = 0.000 and z = -3.441) when comparing unknown proximity versus high prox-
imity condition (high proximity versus low proximity condition). We find that the adaptation 
gap is inversely correlated to the social identity.  
 




Along similar lines, behavioral contagion as a function of both social identification and the 
(un)ethicality of observed behavior is illustrated in figure 5. The behavioral space is described 
by three alternatives and also speaks to the (non-)existence of observed peer effects: 
 No Contagion: after observing peer behavior, the participant either did not revise 
his/her initial behavior or revised it into the opposite direction of what he/she ob-
served the peer has done.  
 Contagion: after observing peer’s behavior, the participant did revise his/her initial 
decision. The revision was directed into the direction of the observed behavior. This 
behavior indicates the existence of behavioral contagion caused by peer effects. 
The breakdown of behavioral changes by different levels of social proximity provides addi-
tional evidence for hypothesis H2. When comparing to the condition where no social proximity 
to one’s observed peer was induced, behavioral is more contagious for both low and high 
proximity situations in both the ethical and unethical domain. Again, since we report lower-
bound results, this is a strong indication that our method of inducing social identification 
works and is likely to produce even stronger results when social proximity would be intro-
duced in a more sophisticated way.   
 
Figure 5: Behavioral change by treatment and observed (un)ethicality. This figure illustrates the fraction of 
participants exhibiting behavioral contagion broken down into both the observed (un)ethicality of behavior 
and the social identity to one’s observed peer. Unless the active participant revises his/her behavior into the 




In terms of explaining the drivers of behavioral contagion, two literature streams have not yet 
been brought together in existing research: the role of social identification on behavioral con-
tagion on the one hand, and the role of observed behavioral unethicality on the other. Our 
experimental design allows us to do exactly this for the first time and ascertain the main driver 
of behavioral contagion. Following our previous discussion, we assume social identification to 
be a stronger driver of behavioral contagion than the unethicality of observed behavior (H3). 
As a first, we investigate whether behavioral contagion is different under varied levels of social 
proximity when directly comparing contagion in the ethical versus the unethical domain using 
non-parametric comparisons. Our results provide strong support that behavioral contagion is 
asymmetric. In particular, a variation in social identification yields no significant variation in 
behavioral changes in the ethical domain. However, the results are strongly statistically signif-
icant when looking at behavioral changes as a function of social identification in the unethical 
domain. Here, when comparing the high proximity condition to the no proximity (low proxim-
ity) condition, the Mann-Whitney-U statistics yield results that are highly significant at the 1% 
level with p = 0.000 and z = 6.025 (p = 0.000 and z = -4.005). These results highlight the im-
portance of our contribution in this paper: peer effects are not uniformly in place, but rather 
strongly depend on both the (un)ethicality of observed behavior and the degree of social iden-
tification to the observed peer. 
 




What is more, we ran several regressions, including OLS, Logit, and Tobit, where applicable, in 
order to assess the robustness of our results. In sum, across different specifications our results 
strongly suggest that the observation of (un)ethical behavior does not trigger any particular 
behavior, neither ethical nor unethical. Thus, the mere observation of behavior alone is insuf-
ficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical sphere, but is rather dependent on 
the social identification to one’s peers. These findings are in support of our hypothesis H3. 
Findings are presented in Appendix A. 
 
All in all, we find convincing support for all of our three hypotheses: unethical behavior is in-
deed more contagious than ethical behavior (H1), social identification drives the magnitude of 
behavioral contagion (H2), and social identification is a more reliable predictor of behavioral 
contagion than the observed (un)ethicality of observed behavior (H3). Here, it is important to 
stress a particular point with respect to the interpretation of the results. Arguably, the exper-
iment’s framed environment created by the presence of a charity could potentially carry a 
norm of prosocial behavior in the lab in and of itself. That is, prior to observing one’s peers, 
some participants at the margin of behaving unethically might carry the normative belief that 
taking from a charity represents inappropriate behavior and thus initially refrain for it. If so, it 
would come as no surprise to observe stronger contagion of unethical as compared to ethical 
behavior because those who wanted to behave unethically in the first place but refrained from 
doing so might now find justification in their peer’s behavior. In this respect, two important 
remarks should be made: first, if anything, such an assumption would only explain level effects 
but not treatment differences because such beliefs are by experimental design uncorrelated 
with the treatments. Consequently, irrespective of the existence of potential norms, our de-
sign renders our main finding valid: behavioral contagion is highest where social identity is 
strongest.48 In addition, we elicited incentivized beliefs about what participants thought about 
his peer’s behavior prior to observing it. As the regressions results suggest, such beliefs yielded 
no explanatory power and thus play no role in neither explaining the magnitude nor the dif-
ferences of behavioral contagion. 
                                               
48 I would like to thank Gary Bolton, René Fahr, and Elena Katok for point this out and for related discussions. 
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From a policy perspective, our results stress that social proximity renders it difficult to change 
individual behavior, but it rather amplifies one’s initial (un)ethicality. We will return to this 
point in our policy recommendations in chapter 7. In light of the very conservative inception 
of social identification of providing very limited information on social identification, we deem 
these results to represent a lower bound thus strengthening the role of social identification 
within the context of behavioral contagion. Our lower-bound approach comes from the fact 
that participants were neither told the exact matching percentage nor the actual interests and 
preferences they had in common. If having been randomly assigned to one of the social iden-
tification treatments, participants only knew whether they were observing a peer with above 
or below average congruence. A more sophisticated way to induce social identification and 
match participants accordingly is likely to produce results that are more pronounced. The well-
engineered mechanisms implemented by dating websites to match people and achieve high 
success rates are a shining example for what is possible: excluding matching partners based 
on personality traits that represent a no-go (e.g. smoking), putting emphasis on particular in-
terests (e.g. sports, religion), or individual characteristics (e.g. looks, education). We delibera-
tively refrained from applying sophisticated measures of this kind and rather resorted to an 
easy-to-use-easy-to-reproduce methodological approach that could be used in future experi-
ments in which inducing salient social identity is key.  
Along these lines, the presence of a potential experimenter demand effects (EDE) is worth 
addressing since their presence has potentially been problematic to prior peer effect studies 
(for a discussion see Thöni & Gächter (2015)). Because we are mainly interested in treatment 
differences rather than in overall levels, the experimenter demand effect is deemed less prob-
lematic as long as its existence and magnitude is orthogonal to the treatment variation (Zizzo, 
2010). Nonetheless, we considered existing experimental studies to rule out experimenter de-
mand effects to the extent possible. Not exclusively to but prominently existing in peer effect 
studies, forced learning (i.e., forced observation of one’s peer’s behavior) might potentially 
induce EDE or even lead to resentment on the side of the participants. Forced observation 
might trigger thoughts related to being expected to use the information to reconsider and 
potentially revise initial behavior. In previous general and peer effect studies in particular, this 
issue has normally been overlooked, mainly to avoid self-selection problems. However, when 
the option not to learn is withheld from participants, the obtained results are potentially con-
founded. We deem this challenging to the study of peer effects and should thus be discussed.  
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Existing research indicates that individuals sometimes choose to deliberately remain ignorant 
about the state of nature (see Carrillo & Mariotti (2000), Dana, Weber & Kuang (2007), Con-
rads & Irlenbusch (2013), Bartling, Engl & Weber (2014), and Grossman (2014)). If present, 
such strategic ignorance might be an important component of our experiment. A potential 
reason not to acquire costless information is related to the avoidance to indulge in negative 
self-image updating or guilt aversion (cf. Wells (1978), Baumeister (1998), Charness & Dufwen-
berg (2006)). One can plausibly assume that such aversion is even stronger when studying 
peer effects within an (un)ethical dimension. Thus, forcing participants to learn potentially 
unpleasant information might lead to biased behavior and might even increase EDE. In order 
to address this challenge, our design follows Conrads & Irlenbusch (2013) and Bartling, Engl & 
Weber (2014) and draws on a mechanism in which learning peer information is voluntary (see 
also Eckel & Petrie (2011)).49 Additionally, in order to rule out any reputational concerns, social 
learning, or reciprocity, the experiment includes an anonymously played one-shot interaction 
with another participant. Such an experimental design allows us to study behavioral contagion 
in the lab in an unbiased way. To our knowledge, this represents a novel design in studying 
peer effects in the lab in general and the behavioral contagion of (un)ethical behavior in par-
ticular while controlling for potential confounds that peer effect studies suffer from regularly 
(see Manski (2000), Falk & Fischbacher (2002), Angrist (2014)). In the light of our experimental 
set-up, any treatment-specific information is provided only after one’s deliberate decision to 
learn peer behavior. Thus, any still potentially existing form of EDE would be fully uncorrelated 
with the treatments and thus exhibit only a general level-effect, if any. 
 
7. Lessons Learned: Policy Implications 
As argued before, understanding social interactions in general and in particular the potentially 
resulting peer effects is fundamental from a policy perspective. It does not only help to under-
stand societal and economic outcomes beyond what standard economic forces can explain 
(i.e., the massive surge in female labor participation rates in World War II (Mulligan, 1998) or 
the escalation of crime rates (Levitt, 1999)). It also allows us to implement better-targeted 
policy measures to tackle a battery of challenges such as reducing crime rates, improving 
                                               
49 However, deliberately allowing participants to remain ignorant about peer behavior bears the risk of self-selection effects. 
It is worth noting that in our experiment 10% of all the participants decided not to acquire peer information. Importantly, 
however, this choice is unconditional on the participant’s initial behavior, thus strongly suggesting the absence of any self-
selection mechanism leading to potential biases in our analysis. 
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health conditions, or increasing labor market participation. “To the extent that theory and 
measurement of social interactions enables us to understand these massive changes, the 
study of social interactions potentially has major policy relevance” (Glaeser & Scheinkman, 
2004, p. 84). In this chapter, we will discuss some of the policy implications that one can infer 
from our results. We will follow the main theme of this paper and approach this topic from 
two sides: the ethical and unethical context (for a broader discussion see Irlenbusch & Villeval 
(2015)). 
Starting with the ethical perspective, voluntary redistribution of income e.g. in the form of 
charitable giving is an integral part of humaneness, with up to 90% of Americans donating to 
charities. Understanding the drivers of charitable giving, such as altruism and social pressure, 
has been at the heart of last decade’s research, both in the field and in the lab (cf. Levitt & List 
(2009), DellaVigna, List & Malmendier (2012)). Still, we seem to have an imperfect understand-
ing of what really motivates giving (Andreoni, 2006). Beyond what we have since learned 
about the existence of peer effects with respect to contribution decisions (see discussion in 
chapter 2 and 3), our experiment yields several new insights helpful to understanding the ex-
tent to which such behavior shows up, especially as compared to unethical behavior. We will 
return to this comparison shortly. 
In turn, unethical behavior in its various forms impairs the daily life. Exemplarily, yearly global 
tax evasion ranges at an abstruse $3.1 trillion or 5.1% of world GDP (The New York Times, 
2011), over $1 trillion is estimated in bribes paid yearly around the globe (The World Bank, 
2013), and some 210 million people use illicit drugs each year (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2011). Here, one might credibly argue that from a purely rational self-maximizing 
perspective we should observe way less illicit behavior than we actually do. From a game the-
oretic perspective, in some illicit deals that involve trust-related actions such as bribery do not 
represent a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is true for both one-shot and finitely 
repeated contexts. Thus, in many situations the occurrence of illicit behavior is already sur-
prising (for a discussion, see Dimant & Schulte (forthcoming)). A solution to this conflict is the 
recognition of, among others, peer effects. As has been thoroughly argued throughout the 
paper, the incorporation of behavioral contagion allows us so explain why observed behavior 
goes seemingly beyond clear-cut self-maximization, but is rather embedded in and the result 
of a social context. 
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Consequently, both aspects raise the following question: how do these findings translate into 
a real world setting and what to do about it? While being careful at drawing concrete infer-
ences from a laboratory setting and relating them directly to the outside world, our results 
conclusively indicate the spillover of unethical behavior to be much more likely than the spill-
over of ethical behavior. That is, getting people to start donating solely based on peer effects 
(e.g. through observing others giving to charity) has a long way to go compared to having them 
do something unethical. What we see, however, is the individual’s responsiveness to social 
identification, in particular on the side of females. A potential solution to have people donate 
more to a good cause is to provide them information beyond simple statistics on what other 
people do, i.e. amount of money that has been collected so far (like Wikipedia). Instead, some 
research already indicates that the inception of social norms especially for settings that most 
closely match the individual’s immediate situational circumstances have the strongest effect 
on compliance (Goldstein, et al., 2008). . Our results suggest to go one step further and provide 
information conveying social proximity to the peers, thus increasing the saliency of social iden-
tification. Exemplarily, a message of the form “People in your neighborhood / with similar 
demographic characteristics have donated an average of $...” would lead to pick-up rates of 
this behavior that are higher than when resorting to a simple statistic.  
In all likelihood, a similar approach could be applied to make people refrain from behaving 
unethically. Research on slippery slope indicates that once behavior is spoiled, even honest 
people converge quickly to a steady state with a plethora of unethical behaviors (cf. Gino & 
Bazerman (2009), Welsh et al. (2015)). Even more worrisome, recidivism rates for convicts are 
normally very high, leading to what is called a recidivism nightmare. In the US recidivism rates 
are up to 80% of re-arrests within the first 3 to 5 years after their release from prison (National 
Institute of Justice, 2014). This is particularly detrimental from a welfare perspective, as the 
US spends approximately $75 billion on incarceration and $260 billion on prevention, detec-
tion, and prosecution of crime on a yearly basis (Khadjavi, 2015). In terms of effective coun-
termeasures to unethical behavior, our experimental results indicate that exposing individuals 
to unfaithful of socially close people is likely to trigger repulsion and less unethical behavior, 
thus contributing to a positive transformation.50 
 
                                               
50 For an approach along similar lines, see Pennsylvania State University's Justice Center for Research on desistance from 
crime (Pennsylvania State University's Justice Center for Research, 2014).  
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8. Conclusion and Outlook 
Deviant behavior that benefits oneself at the expense of others is socially harmful and brings 
about second-best solutions that are distortive from a welfare perspective. Conversely, the 
voluntary redistribution of money to those who have the least, e.g. in the form of donations, 
is socially desired. It is worthwhile to understand the underlying mechanism that drives 
(un)ethical behavior in order to implement effective policy measures that mitigate or facilitate 
either behavior. Beyond pure self-maximizing considerations, behavior is also be the result of 
social interactions in which the conformity to particular behavior is affected by one’s peers 
(Akerlof (1997), Glaeser & Scheinkman (2004)). One particular mechanism through which so-
cial interactions occur are peer effects, which play a decisive role in explaining societal and 
economic outcomes. A battery of behavioral traits affects the shape and magnitude in which 
social interactions occur. An extensive stream of literature suggests that individuals are social 
animals and care for esteem, respect, reputation, among other things (cf. Rabin (1993), Fehr 
& Schmidt (1999), Akerlof & Kranton (2000), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), Charness & Rabin 
(2002),  Bénabou & Tirole (2011)). As such, individuals steadily act and react in social environ-
ments that define their role and standing within the social group.  
Although peer effects have been extensively studied in different contexts both in the field and 
in the lab (see discussion in chapter 3.3), research is still at the outset of understanding the 
role of peer effects in (un)ethical settings. It is this paper’s goal to improve our understanding 
of whether, to which extent, and through which channels individuals are influenced by their 
peers to engage in (un)ethical behavior, in which they most likely would have not engaged 
otherwise.  
This paper is in line with and an extension of the seminal Moving-to-Opportunity field research 
that has allowed us to understand the positive societal spillovers of having the chance to move 
to a better neighborhood.  In going beyond, we try to understand the spillovers of both un-
ethical and ethical behavior and the role of social identity to one’s peers by employing a con-
trolled lab experiment. Understanding behavioral contagion is important from a policy per-
spective in order to set the right incentives and effective measures to improve pro-sociality 
and mitigate unethical behavior. 
By extending existing research from both the methodological and the content perspective, 
our work contributes to a better understanding of the nature of peer effects and behavioral 
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spillovers, and answers the following two questions in particular: for one, to what extent does 
the (un)ethicality of a peer’s observed behavior influence one’s own behavior? For another, 
what is the role of social identity to one’s peers in affecting behavioral contagion? For our 
purposes, we extend a variant of the give-or-take dictator game as introduced by List (2007) 
and used by Bardsley (2008) by the use of an ethical setting. To provide clean evidence on 
peer effects, we capitalize on a one-shot dictator game in which participants are given the 
opportunity to give to or take money away from the charity before and after learning the 
(un)ethical magnitude of peer behavior. Treatment variations include different levels of social 
identity to the observed peers, which we incept by the novel use of a matching algorithm 
based on a series of dating website questions. We deliberatively refrained from applying so-
phisticated measures of this kind and rather resorted to an easy-to-use-easy-to-reproduce 
methodological approach that could be used in future experiments in which inducing salient 
social identity is key. 
Our results suggest that a) unethical behavior is more contagious, and b) social identification 
with one’s peers and not the (un)ethicality of observed behavior is the main driver of behav-
ioral contagion. Our results conclusively yield that the mere observation of behavior alone is 
insufficient for the existence of peer effects in the (un)ethical sphere, but is rather depend-
ent on the social identification to one’s peers. 
Beyond these first results, much more scientific research has to be done in order to generate 
reliable measures to achieve both, more ethical and less unethical behavior. Exemplarily, re-
cent MTO-research points at gender differences in behavioral assimilation (cf. Chetty, Hen-
dren & Katz (2015)). It is important to understand to which extent these differences are 
driven by the two factors studied in this paper: the (un)ethicality of peer behavior one is ex-
posed to and the magnitude of social identity to one’s peers. Our research is hopefully one 
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A: Data Overview, Robustness Checks, and Additional Results 
 
 









Observed Ethical Behavior 44 27 34 105 
Observed Unethical Behavior 39 42 41 122 
Total 83 69 75 227 
 
A1: Summary table of the observations by treatment variation and observed unethicality 
 
Our theoretical foundation (chapter 5.2.2) assumes behavioral adaptation to be asymmetri-
cally biased towards unethical behavior, holding social identification constant. Thus, for adap-
tation gap (%), the results suggest that the observation of ethical (unethical) behavior leads 
to a less (more) pronounced closing of the adaptation gap. More precisely, the results indicate 
that observing unethical behavior leads to a revision behavior that reduces the gap between 
own initial and observed peer’s behavior more strongly (from 100% down to 69.4%) as com-
pared to observing ethical behavior (from 100% down to 78.5%). The differences are margin-
ally significant at the 10% level (p < 0.074, z = 1.787). This implies that, if anything, individuals 
who observe unethical behavior go a long way and close the observed gap by some 66% 
through revising their initial decision, while individuals who observe ethical behavior reduce 
the gap only slightly by 14%. This result is not only in line with the theoretical predictions of 
our asymmetric model, but also suggests that one’s inherent conquest to do good is less pro-
nounced than to do bad, which yields additional support not only for hypothesis H1 but also 




A2: Adaptation gap (%) by observed (un)ethicality. The gap is calculated as the difference between the individual’s revised 
decision and the behavior observed from the peer relative to the difference between one’s initial behavior and the be-
havior observed from the peer. That is, the adaptation gap indicates how different the behavior between two participants 
are after the active participant was given the chance to revise his/her initial behavior. In this sense, the narrower the gap, 
the more similar the active and the respective passive participants are in terms of (un)ethical behavior. Participants who 
did not revise their initial behavior are treated as adaptation gap = 100%. The analysis is broken down into the (un)ethi-
cality of observed behavior by the active participants 
 
Overall, the results relating to hypothesis H1 (see Figure 3 and A2) indicate that not only is the 
contagion of ethical behavior only half as likely as contagion of unethical behavior but it is also 
less pronounced. Following our results, ethical behavior is imitated only to a limited extent as 




We ran several OLS specifications to control for treatment effects, initial behavioral heteroge-
neity, observed behavior, and gender (including several interaction effects). Although not ex-
plicitly shown in the regression table, adding controls for, among others, risk, self-control, and 
greed show up as insignificant and did not alter the robustness of the results presented here. 
Overall, the presented results are robust to the inclusion of controls and across different spec-
ifications and estimation methods. Estimations are available upon request. In addition, we ran 
robustness checks using Tobit estimations in order to account for potentially censored behav-
ior caused by ceiling effects in revision behavior.  
The estimations yield a number of interesting results. For example, the high proximity condi-
tion, in which social identity was highest, shows up significantly negative across different spec-
ifications. The negative coefficient suggests that comparing to a situation in which social prox-
imity remained unknown to the observer (Baseline), being exposed to a high proximity signal 
induced a downward revision of one’s initial behavior. More precisely, participants took away 
29%-36% more money from the charity in the high social identification condition independent 
of the (un)ethicality of the observed behavior. This effect is not statistically significantly pro-
nounced for the low proximity condition. These numbers are in line with the findings pre-
sented previously, indicating that peer effects are particularly present in a high social identifi-
cation environment, which over-proportionally crowds-out ethical behavior and leads to more 
unethical behavior. The adaptation gap observed by the individual, which is the difference 
between one’s own and the peer’s initial behavior in monetary terms, leads to a similar rea-
soning: individuals over-proportionally react to a larger gap by negatively revising one’s initial 
amount, indicating that an increase in observed adaptation gap leads to more unethical be-
havior overall. 
In addition, our results also suggest that one’s initial behavior strongly predicts the direction 
of behavioral contagion. This speaks to the idea that the individual’s predisposition to behave 
(un)ethically is essential for the direction of behavioral spillovers caused by peer effects. More 
precisely, behaving (un)ethically when peer effects are absent renders it likely to behave even 
more (un)ethically when being exposed to peer effects. Compared to the base level of no 
change in the initially fair 50:50 split between oneself and the charity, the revision of one’s 
initial (un)ethical behavior is similar in either direction in terms of magnitude. Relative to one’s 
initial behavior, the numbers indicate that an individual is likely to donate (take) between 9%-
19% (19-23%) more money when his/her initial decision was to donate (take) money after 
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observing peer’s behavior, thus again supporting the asymmetry of behavioral contagion. Con-
sequently, beyond social identification one’s initial behavior is highly predictive of how an in-
dividual reacts to peer effects. The results also suggest that initial behavior represents a trait 
that is consistent and robust to the exposure to peer effects: those who decided to behave 
(un)ethically in the first place are likely to remain (un)ethical, only to a more pronounced ex-
tent. We do not observe behavioral heterogeneity across gender. The table A3 below illus-
trates our results. In addition to analyzing the magnitude of behavioral change, we find the 
same robust results when looking at the drivers of behavioral contagion in general. Results 
using logit estimations are reported in Appendix A4. What is more, we find similarly robust 
results when further subdividing No Contagion into those who were invariant to the observed 
behavior and thus did not react at all and those who reacted but changed their behavior into 
the opposite direction of what they have observed (anti-contagion). We apply a multinomial 




A3: Amount Revised (%) as a function of social identification and observed unethicality. Model 1 and 5 (Model 2 and 6) tests for the effect of the treatments (of observed unethicality) while controlling 
for initial behavior and the observed adaptation gap. Model 3 (Model 7) tests for both treatment effects and observed unethicality simultaneously.  Model 4 (Model 8) adds controls for gender 
and some interaction terms as well as the number of interest. In order to rule out any endogenous concerns and stress the effectiveness of exogenous variation of social proximity we also add 




A4: Examination of the adaptation gap (%) using Logit estimations. Participants who did not revise their initial decision are 





A5: Examination of the drivers of behavioral contagion using a multinomial logistic regression. Behavior of participants who 





Following the regression results, our results also speak to the idea that behavioral contagion 
seems to facilitate the magnitude of (un)ethical behavior rather than changing individual be-
havior to the better or worse, respectively. That is, those who behaved (un)ethically in the 
first place become even more (un)ethical after being exposed to their peers. This is true for 
both revision of one’s initial amount and the reduction of the adaptation gap to one’s peer. In 
more detail and in line with our previous results, this relation is more pronounced the more 
salient social identity to one’s peers is and in particular in the unethical domain. This is addi-
tional support for our hypothesis H1 that unethical behavior is more contagious than ethical 
behavior. We find similar results for those who decided to keep the fair equal split in the be-
ginning, while the behavioral change of those who donated initially seem not to be susceptible 
to changes in social identity. The figure below illustrates results. 
 
A6: The upper (lower) graph depicts the amount revised (%) (adaptation gap (%)) conditional on initial behavior broken down 
by social proximity. This figure depicts the percentage of initial behavior revised as a function of the participant’s initial 
behavior and broken down into different social identity categories. Essentially, the figure illustrates the magnitude and 
direction of behavioral contagion after observing the passive peer conditional on one’s initial decision prior to having 





B: Social Identity Statements  
 
1. I am a reliable person. 
2. I am interested in politics and/or economics. 
3. Money is important to me. 
4. I am an honest and sincere person. 
5. I am a cinephile. 
6. I am interested in sports. 
7. I am a religious person and faith is important to me. 
8. I am fond of animals. 
9. I am interested in art and/or cultures. 
10. I am an active and adventurous person. 
11. I am interested in cars and/or technology. 
12. I am fond of children and family-oriented. 
13. I am interested in foreign languages and/or countries. 
14. I am a warmhearted and helpful person. 
15. I am a tolerant person. 
16. I like to gossip. 
17. I am a faithful person. 
18. I play an instrument. 
19. I like to go out and dance. 
20. I am a goal-oriented person. 
21. I spend a lot of time in front of the TV. 
22. I am a sociable person and like to be among people.  
23. I like to play videogames. 
24. I am a humorous and entertaining person. 
25. I am a strong-willed person. 
 




C: Experimental Instructions 
 
General Information on the Experiment 
 First of all, we would like to thank you very much for participating in this experiment. 
Please read the instructions carefully. The experiment will last for about 45-60 
minutes.  
 
 During the entire experiment, no communication is allowed. If there is something you 
do not understand or if you have any questions, now or at some point during the ex-
periment, please raise your hand and remain seated. One of our colleagues will come 
to you and answer your question. 
 
 During the experiment, you have the possibility to earn money. The amount you will 
receive at the end of the session depends on how many “Taler” you earn during the 
experiment.  
 
 At the end of the experiment, the amount of “Taler“ that you have earned will be con-
verted into real money at an exchange rate of 20 Taler = 1 Euro.  
 
 All decisions you make during this experiment will remain anonymous. None of the 
participants gets to know the identity of other participants in the experiment and de-
cisions cannot be linked to a specific participant.  Moreover, you will be paid anony-







Order of Events: 
 The experiment consists of a list of statements that you will receive at the beginning 
and further decisions. Explanations and information related to these decisions will be 
given as the experiment progresses. You will make these decisions once.  
 
 Both you as well as a charitable organization of your choice (i.e. an officially registered 
charity organization) will be provisionally assigned a monetary amount of 300 Taler 
each.  
 
 During the experiment you will have to decided on whether you want to…  
 … take a part or all of the money from the charitable organization. 
 … leave the division of the sum of money as it is. 
 … give a part or all of your money to the charitable organization.  
 
 In case you decide to take money from the charitable organization, the respective 
amount of money will be transferred to your individual cash account and exactly the 
same amount will be deducted from the cash account of the charitable organization.   
 
 Should you decide to give money to the charitable organization of your choice, the 
respective amount of money will be deducted from your individual cash account and 
given to the charity. The experimenter will double all ECUs remaining in the charity’s 
account at the end of the experiment. 
 
 Your decision remains anonymous and neither the other participants of the experi-
ment nor the experimenters have the possibility to assign your choices to your identity.  
 
 At the end of the experiment, one participant will be chosen at random and his or her 
choice will be implemented and count towards the charity (i.e. that choice will be rel-
evant for the payment). In particular, we will double the respective amount and donate 
it to the charity after the experiment ends. The receipt of this donation will be pub-
lished on the homepage of the BaER-Lab (www.baer-lab.org) in a timely manner. All 
84 
 
other participants will receive 150 Taler (including the show-up fee) at the end of the 
experiment.   
 
 The total payoff of the participants:  
 In case you are the randomly chosen participant 
300 Taler +/- the amount of money that has been given to/taken from the cash 
account of the charitable organization 
 In case you are not the randomly chosen participant 
150 Taler 
 
 The total payoff of the charitable organization:  
 (Amount of money in the cash account of the charitable organization of the ran-
domly chosen participant) × 2 
 
 At the end of the experiment, the relevant information on the payment will be made 
visible to each participant on his or her screen.  
 
 After the actual experiment concludes, we will ask you to fill out a questionnaire. 




D:  Screenshots of Decision Screens 
 
















3. Observation of one’s peer and potential revision of one’s initial decision 
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Important: treatments vary by the information on the social proximity measure (first box): unknown similarity (Baseline), more similar (Treat-






(Exemplarily for revision of one’s initial decision) 
 
